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LESSONS FOR COMPETITION LAW
FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS:
THE PROSPECT FOR ANTITRUST RESPONSES TO
THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PHENOMENON
Jesse W. Markham, Jr. *
“[If] the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate giants
that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive role in
economic affairs . . . .”
—Robert Pitofsky 1

ABSTRACT
This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust law
could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-bigto-fail problem. The article begins by exploring the nature of the
problem. Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and
rules to evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role. The
article concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an
emphasis on avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful
public policy tool to address the problem. However, it can come
nowhere near solving it or preventing recurrences of recent systemic
failures.

*
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Law. A version of this article was presented by the author at the Murphy Conference
on Corporate Law at Fordham University Law School, March 12, 2010. The author
wishes to express his gratitude to many who contributed to the research and writing of
this article in a variety of capacities. Professor Steven Schatz graciously reviewed an
early stage of the article. Robin Bennett provided invaluable background research. The
University of San Francisco School of Law provided generous support for this project
and the law faculty, in numbers too great to thank here individually, offered insightful
suggestions at a presentation based on a formative draft.
1. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051,
1051 (1979).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines whether, and the extent to which, antitrust
law could contribute to a broader regulatory effort to control the too-bigto-fail problem. The article begins by exploring the nature of the
problem. Against this backdrop, it considers antitrust policy and rules to
evaluate whether antitrust might play a meaningful role. The article
concludes that antitrust law, if vigorously enforced with an emphasis on
avoiding too-big-to-fail problems, can be a useful public policy tool to
address the problem. However, it can come nowhere near solving it or
preventing recurrences of recent systemic failures. The narrowed focus
antitrust developed under the influence of the Chicago School greatly
limits its potential utility in this context and it is worth serious
reconsideration. Nevertheless, the dynamism of antitrust policy in
adjusting to intellectual movements and economic conditions could be
harnessed to re-establish the broad reach of antitrust and thus forge a
reasonably useful public policy weapon to direct at the too-big-to-fail
problem. Antitrust law could make a greater contribution in resolving
this public policy problem if Congress enacted or the judiciary forged
more robust rules preventing and dismantling unwieldy corporate size in
excess of any plausible scale efficiency justification. Such rules would
be consistent with the historic purposes of antitrust law: to protect
consumers against the output, innovation and price effects of
catastrophic failures.
It is worth noting at the outset that the thesis here is not that
antitrust law, even if more vigorously interpreted and enforced, could
have made much difference in averting any part of the recent global
financial crisis. There is no real consensus about the causes of that
crisis, but recent changes in the business of global banking and finance
beyond the mere size of financial enterprises contributed to a systemic
weakness, rather than isolated weakness in one or a few participants.
When Bear Stearns was rescued, the intent presumably was to prevent
that domino from toppling into others and knocking down too many
others. Since holding that domino upright did not prevent systemic
failure, it seems probable that the causes do not merely reside in one or a
few too-big-to-fail enterprises, but, rather, underlie the system.
Nevertheless, there remains an important public policy issue
regarding whether to permit firms to combine where the resulting
enterprise exceeds efficient scale and at the same time escapes failure by
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being too-big-to-fail. If the out-sized firm is not allowed to fail, then
allowing it to exist creates a risk to the economy and the treasury. If no
offsetting benefit exists, the question then becomes whether there exists
an administratively practical way for antitrust law to help contain the
size of such enterprises.
This article presupposes the existence of some enterprises in key
sectors of our economy whose scale exceeds optimal efficient levels, but
that are too big to allow them to fail. These are arguable assumptions
that I leave to others to argue about. This article does not seek to resolve
those empirical questions, but, rather, to explore whether antitrust should
play a role in controlling the too-big-to-fail problem if these assumptions
are accurate.
A. THE PARADOX OF TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL AND ANTITRUST
It seems paradoxical that antitrust law appears to have had nothing
to say about the problem of firms becoming too big to fail. The antitrust
laws are uniquely addressed to the problem of maintaining healthy
markets against distortion from excessive aggregations of economic
power. Yet, antitrust law has not intervened to prevent or redress the
recent outbreak of systemic threats caused directly by companies that are
too big and too integral to the functioning of markets to allow those
firms to function normally without massive governmental infusions of
capital. In some instances, these companies have accumulated assets
exceeding $1 trillion, 2 and they cut across a broad swath of economic
activity, including investment banking, 3 depositary banking, 4 insurance, 5
2. As of September 30, 2008, American International Group, Inc. (“AIG”)
reported assets exceeding $1 trillion. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: RESTRUCTURING OF THE GOVERNMENT’S FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 1 (2008), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/CongressionalReportRestructuringFinal.pdf
[hereinafter AIG REPORT].
3. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: BRIDGE
LOAN TO BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES THROUGH JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. (2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearns
bridgeloan.pdf [hereinafter BEAR STEARNS REPORT].
4. On September 25, 2008, JPMorgan Chase acquired the banking operations of
Washington Mutual Bank in a transaction facilitated by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. See Press Release, JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of
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securities, 6 mortgage lending, 7 and automobile manufacturing. 8 All of
these industries are subject to antitrust law. Furthermore, nearly all of
the firms that have been considered too big to fail grew, in large part, by
acquisition activity that is within the reach of antitrust laws and subject
to pre-transaction government clearance. 9 Yet, antitrust laws did
nothing to intervene to prevent these firms from reaching potentially
catastrophic dimensions. The Sherman Act surely was not enacted so
that firms could become so big, and so economically and politically
powerful, that the mere possibility of their failure would impose
unacceptable policy choices on the nation. Why, then, are so many firms
too big to fail, and why has antitrust not done its part to prevent the
possibility of these catastrophic failures?
This paradox begins to unravel when one considers the evernarrowing reach of modern antitrust law. As currently interpreted by the
courts, U.S. antitrust law is a shadow of its original self. Whatever
animated their enactment, antitrust laws no longer concern themselves
with preventing bigness, and indeed tend instead to encourage largescale enterprise for efficiency’s sake. Beginning with Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 10 the antitrust laws in the United States began
a steady process of judicial erosion to eliminate multiple and possibly
conflicting policy objectives, distilling in their place the exclusive
purpose of promoting consumer welfare through allocative and dynamic

Washington Mutual: FDIC Facilitates Transaction that Protects All Depositors and
Comes at No Cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (Sept. 25, 2008), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html.
5. AIG REPORT, supra note 3.
6. See, BEAR STEARNS REPORT, supra note 4.
7. “On Saturday, September 6, 2008, FHFA placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
into conservatorships.” See, Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: Examining Recent
Regulatory Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, 110th CONG. 2 (2008) (statement of James B. Lockhart, III, Director, Federal
Housing Finance Agency), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/120/
revisedtestimonySBC102308.pdf.
8. Robert Marko, Note, Road Closed: The Inequitable Treatment of Pre-Closing
Products Liability Claimants Under the Auto Industry Bailout, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 353, 353 (2010).
9. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires pretransaction notification to the federal antitrust authorities of most mergers and
acquisitions where the parties and transaction meet certain inflation-adjusted size
thresholds. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
10. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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efficiency. With marginal and mostly theoretical exceptions, the
efficient allocation of society’s scarce resources through the use of
existing technologies and the production of goods and services more
efficiently using innovative new ones, comprise the sum total of the
residual policy underpinnings of modern antitrust law. 11 In light of these
modern movements in antitrust law, it is perhaps not entirely surprising
that antitrust law has not prevented the too-big-to-fail problem, since
consumer welfare may be enhanced, rather than harmed, by permitting
firms to become big and even indispensible.
However, the paradox is not altogether attributable to the narrowing
focus of modern antitrust law. Although at one time antitrust law
11. It has been argued that “[t]o this day, the Supreme Court has not come close to
saying that economic efficiency is the exclusive concern of the antitrust laws . . .”
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 69 (3d ed. 2005). However, no Sherman Act case since Klor’s, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), has even arguably turned on the
policies of personal freedom to pursue economic opportunity, or the statutory policy of
policing fairness in the marketplace, although those policies were frequently echoed in
early antitrust cases. Aside from cases decided under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b, 21a (2000), no recent antitrust case turned on the policy of favoring
small enterprise for its own sake, also frequently given voice on in an early generation
of Sherman Act decisions. More to the point, however, there has been an outright
abandonment of what once was central antitrust policy favoring fragmented markets
populated by small businesses, even at some expense in the form of efficiency. Recent
decisions make no mention of any general antipathy for big business nor preference for
smaller enterprise, such as Judge Hand invoked in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America:
“[A]mong the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before them. .
. . Throughout the history of [the Sherman Act, the Surplus Property Act and the
Small Business Mobilization Act] it has been constantly assumed that one of their
purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible
cost, an organization of industry in small unites which can effectively compete
with each other.”

148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945). Since Brown Shoe v. United States, there has
been no serious mention by the high court of any preference for small enterprise for its
own sake. 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (“But we cannot fail to recognize Congress’ desire
to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned,
businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these
competing considerations in favor of decentralization.”). The most recent reference by
the Supreme Court to the preference for “keeping a large number of small competitors
in business” was the much excoriated United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 275 (1966).
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considered the emergence of very large corporations to present
unacceptable risks to the public, the risks that were of concern did not
include the too-big-to-fail problem. Instead, antitrust law in an earlier
era was concerned about the threat of harm out-sized enterprise posed to
others by its sheer power, rather than its vulnerability to collapse. Thus,
there remains a perplexing aspect to this paradox: even the more robust
antitrust regime that was overrun by the modern law and economics
movement seems to have been unconcerned with preventing systemic
failure by constraining firms from becoming too big to fail.
Curiously, though, the older antitrust regime was very much
concerned with bigness for reasons that apply to the too-big-to-fail firm.
Before the courts rewrote them, United States antitrust laws were
understood as providing the public with protection against behemoth
economic enterprises not only because of their tendency toward market
dominance, but also because of their power to paralyze or control
democratic institutions through their vast wealth. Nearly 100 years ago,
Justice Harlan described the Sherman Act as arising from a universal
conviction that “the country was in real danger from another kind of
slavery . . . that would result from the aggregations of capital in the
hands of a few.” 12 As recently as 1979, near the onset of the Chicago
School antitrust revolution, Robert Pitofsky wrote:
It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By ‘political values,’ I
mean, first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and, second, a desire to
enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere
controls the welfare of all. A third and overriding political concern
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more
13
intrusive role in economic affairs.

Of course, this final prediction could not have been more accurate.
The ungainly size and perceived indispensability of “too-big-to-fail”
enterprises has recently forced the government to become the largest
12. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
13. Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1051.
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investor in the U.S. automobile industry, 14 a controlling owner of some
of the largest lenders in the country, including Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae, 15 and to inject hundreds of billions of dollars into the financial
services sector through equity investments, loans and loan guarantees. 16
The government also has infused federal funds into the home mortgage
refinance marketplace to forestall foreclosures. 17 At least some of this
government intervention was at least arguably a consequence of these
sectors of the economy being “dominated by a few corporate giants.”
Moreover, government intrusion into the private sector in response to
the too-big-to-fail issue appears to be nowhere near an end. Additional
government intervention of a more durable sort seems inevitable as
Congress considers enacting new laws to try to forestall in the future
what existing regulatory law did not. Federal and state regulation has
been enacted or is under consideration addressing dozens of areas of
economic activity including real estate mortgage lending practices,
trading in derivatives and other securities, solvency of financial
institutions, management compensation, corporate governance, and even
the permissible maximum size and investment activity of banks.
From its origins, antitrust law has been concerned with preventing
the accumulation and exercise of economic power in big enterprises,
rather than the vulnerability of the public to potential widespread
economic disruption from the inherent vulnerability of big enterprises. 18
It has never concerned itself with firms being too big to fail. Indeed, the
events that began in the second half of 2007 have led to a good deal of
reflection about the extent to which antitrust law has weakened in recent
decades and whether its focus has become too narrow. However, as
various alternative regulatory strategies are considered to address the
problem, antitrust law has emerged as having at least some potential to
promote a healthier economy that relies less on the economic stability of
a small number of very large firms. There is renewed interest in
14.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
1 (2009).
15. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONTAINING FINANCIAL CRISIS 1620 (2008).
16. EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FINANCIAL MARKET
INTERVENTION FAQ 2-4 (2008).
17. See, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289,
122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
18. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
AND AUTOMAKERS’ RESTRUCTURING TO DATE
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reinvigorating antitrust law to address the too-big-to-fail problem by
invoking its original underlying policy concerns.
Federal Trade Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch has advanced the
view that a merger with the potential for catastrophic effects on a market
as a whole can be challenged under the Clayton Act or the Federal Trade
Commission Act for its tendency to destroy competition and harm
consumers. He has also opined that amendments to antitrust laws are
not needed to bring these Acts to bear in preventing undesirable growth
of enterprises. 19 That view, though admittedly controversial, is an
important one because it suggests the possibility of expanding existing
analytical approaches, rather than necessarily amending the antitrust
laws or turning exclusively to regulatory law instead. Assistant
Attorney General for antitrust Christine Varney has also suggested that
the relaxation of antitrust enforcement played a role in creating
conditions that led to the economic collapse in 2008, which similarly
suggests that enforcement of existing law could contribute to broader
efforts to prevent catastrophic business collapses. 20
While these official views may be correct, antitrust law might
surely play an even more important role if it were reinvigorated.
Although there is no precedent for applying antitrust sanctions to block
corporate expansion for the reason that a company might catastrophically fail to the detriment of the nation’s economy as a whole, there is
no reason in principle why antitrust law could not respond to the
emergence of such growth in the future. Of course, it may be that some
too-big-to-fail companies got there without any possibility of antitrust
intervention, at least not as antitrust is currently understood. Indeed, if
19. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the New York
Bar Association Annual Dinner: Implications of the Financial Meltdown for the FTC
(Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter, Rosch] (“The Clayton Act is inherently prospective and the
current standard prevents anticompetitive harm in its incipiency. Hence, if a merger
creates a firm whose failure is likely to have a catastrophic effect on the market as a
whole, because it is so integral to the market, the end result may be a substantial
lessening of competition.”).
20. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks
as Prepared for the United States Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous Antitrust
Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm (“This country’s prior experience
raises the question of whether current economic challenges reflect a ‘failure of
antitrust.’ In other words, could United States antitrust authorities have done more? As
many observers agree, in past years, with the exception of cartel enforcement, the
pendulum swung too far from Thurman Arnold’s legacy of vigorous enforcement.”).
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one considers the recent failures of companies like AIG and Citigroup,
which grew via conglomerate rather than horizontal accretion, even a
clairvoyant prediction of the catastrophe that these companies
precipitated would not have drawn antitrust intervention under the
existing approach. However, other accumulations of corporate size,
such as the mergers of financial institutions that were already too-big-tofail, might be an appropriate target for antitrust law. Thus, the potential
that antitrust law could prevent some ultimately catastrophic
combinations or even force break-ups of companies that become too big
merits at least some consideration.
This article argues that modern antitrust law can contribute more
than it has to reigning in the causes of long-run systemic instability
represented by the too-big-to-fail problem. Post-Chicago antitrust law
narrowly focuses on allocative efficiency, which is rarely directly
threatened by the sorts of risky conduct that give rise to systemic
failures. However, antitrust law and policy have shown impressive
adaptability and dynamism over the 120 years since the enactment of the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 21 Indeed, despite the evolution of
antitrust law in recent decades, the broad array of policies that
represented the foundations of antitrust for roughly a century have begun
to rekindle interest among scholars and policymakers – and antitrust law
reinvigorated by a revival of the original broader policy underpinnings
that predated the law and economics movement might have at least a
less modest role to play.
This article explores the potential application of such a revived
antitrust law to the problem of the too-big-to-fail enterprise. It argues
that a combination of reinvigorated existing law in conjunction with new
antitrust legislation, could contribute significantly to the public policy
arsenal of weapons for confronting this problem without offending the
fundamental objectives of antitrust law. Part II of this article defines the
problem of “too-big-to fail” and identifies some of its essential
characteristics. Part III examines the limited reach of modern U.S.
antitrust law, particularly how it largely fails to address the essential
characteristics of too-big-to-fail firms. Part IV then explores whether
new or revived antitrust rules might provide some traction in addressing
the policy problem presented by threats of catastrophic market failures.
Part V concludes by advocating a modest proposal for reform.

21.

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004).
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: SOME ELEMENTS OF
THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PROBLEM
A. THE PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMA – DAMNED EITHER WAY
Applying antitrust concepts to the too-big-to-fail problem would
seek to prevent or soften a public policy dilemma that has recently
forced difficult choices on the nation. The prospect of protecting a
company against failure presents a deeply troublesome public policy
dilemma. If a firm’s failure will cause a wave of failures in a large
enough segment of the economy as a whole, one policy option is to
provide public infusions of capital to stave off unacceptable outcomes
that would follow the failure, such as widespread economic disruption.
The bailout policy choice, however, carries with it another unacceptable
outcome in addition to the taxpayer burden: moral hazard. Public rescue
distorts future rational economic calculations of decision makers
throughout the economy. Economic actors can be expected to take
greater risks if they believe that they will be protected against adverse
consequences. Furthermore, the bailout prospect for only the largest
firms creates a potentially undesirable incentive for firms to grow in
order to attain that protection. If a firm can become “too big to fail,” it
can more freely run risks with the expectation that the attendant risks
will shift to the treasury rather than shareholders and managers. The
risk-assessment incentive structure created by the likelihood of bailouts
thus encourages firms to position themselves precariously and to take
risks that would otherwise be irrational. 22 Therefore, a bailout may
solve one failure by inviting others later on.
Another public policy dilemma created by a threatened systemic
failure is presented when a government with finite resources must
choose which among competing failures to cure via bailout funding. In
the recent crisis, the federal government elected to preserve one
investment bank, but not another. In March, 2008, Bear Stearns advised
federal regulatory agencies that its liquidity position was so depleted that
it would need to file for bankruptcy the next day absent an infusion of
Within days, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
capital. 23

22. See GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARDS OF
BANK BAILOUTS 11 (2004).
23. Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear
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Department moved to fund approximately $30 billion to JPMorgan
Chase to allow the commercial bank to acquire the failing investment
bank. 24 Six months later, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was
confronted with the failure of another investment bank, Lehman
Brothers. 25 Although the Fed again considered a bridge solution via
Bank of America and Barclays, and those banks declined, ultimately the
Federal Reserve participated in a decision about how far it would go to
preserve both investment banks. 26 Lehman Brothers is gone, Bear
Stearns was saved. Regulators themselves concede that they should not
be making this sort of choice:
Normally the market sorts out which companies survive and which
fail, and that is as it should be . . . To prevent a disorderly failure of
Bear Stearns and the unpredictable but likely severe consequences
for the market functioning and broader economy, the Federal
Reserve, in close consultation with the Treasury Department, agreed
27
to provide funding to Bear Stearns through JPMorgan Chase.

The different contexts in which the two decisions were made may
very well explain and even justify the Fed’s different approaches to Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers. A decision in November 2008 to salvage
Lehman Brothers would have been made by a Fed that was already
buried in political fallout from its earlier rescue of Bear Stearns and in
an economic environment that was going to require considerably more
Fed assistance than was politically realistic. Something had to give way,
and it turned out to be an investment bank. The demise of Lehman
Brothers seems to have been forced by the many too-big-to-fail crises
looming over the Fed as it made its decision.
Therefore, the too-big-too-fail dilemma is twofold. First, the
prospect of such a failure forces the government to choose between
unacceptable immediate economic risks and long-term moral hazard.
Stearns, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2008, at A1.
24. Id.
25. Damian Paletta et al., Lehman Fate Spurs Emergency Session --- Wall Street
Titans Seek Ways to Stem Widening Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2008, at A1.
26. Jon Hilsenrath et al., Crisis Mode: Paulson, Bernanke Strained for Consensus
in Bailout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A1.
27. Developments in the Financial Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080403a.htm.

272

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

Second, it can involve the government in making decisions that are
generally left to marketplace dynamics and outside the normal provinces
of regulatory intervention, which runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of a capitalist economic system.
B. BIGNESS
Before turning to the antitrust law issues, it is worth pausing to
examine the phenomenon of systemic failure and the characteristics of
firms that create the threat. “Too-big-to-fail” is shorthand and widely
agreed to be a misnomer because “bigness” alone is not the problem.
Very big firms in a number of industries have failed without provoking
serious discussion of public bailout to avoid broader economic systemic
failures.
For example, Enron failed in late 2001, at a time when it employed
approximately 22,000 people and claimed to have revenues exceeding
$100 billion. 28 Based on reported revenues, Enron ranked 7th on the
Fortune 500 list in 2001. 29 Its failure was not attended with any serious
consideration of bailing it out, despite the enormous hardships that its
demise visited upon tens of thousands of citizens. Enron was big, but
not “too big to fail,” and indeed the Chairman of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission reported to Congress a few months later that
“Enron’s collapse has not caused significant damage to the nation’s
energy trading or energy supplies.” 30
Similarly, WorldCom was ranked the 42d largest company in
America when it failed in 2001 with $39.2 billion in reported revenues
and 85,000 employees. 31 WorldCom was not simply big, it was far
flung, having acquired MCI in 1998 to become the second largest U.S.
long-distance carrier, and also having acquired UNet, CompuServe, and
America Online’s data network to become a leading internet
28. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED 83 (2010).
29. MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENRON COLLAPSE: AN
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL ISSUES 1 (2002).
30. The Effect of the Bankruptcy of Enron on the Functioning of Energy Markets:
Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 107th Cong. 32 (2002) (statement of Hon. Patrick H. Woods III,
Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
31. BOB LYKE & MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WORLDCOM: THE
ACCOUNTING SCANDAL 2, 4 (2002).
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infrastructure operator. 32 Its market capitalization dropped precipitously
by nearly $150 billion by early July 2002 as a consequence of
revelations about accounting irregularities and also due to the vast
oversupply in the market for telecommunications capacity. 33 On July
21, 2002, WorldCom filed what was at the time the largest bankruptcy in
the nation’s history. 34 No public policy debate emerged over whether to
bail WorldCom out of its difficulties despite the extensive hardships and
economic disruption its failure prompted.
C. INTERRELATEDNESS WITH THE ECONOMIC ECOSYSTEM:
UNUSUAL DEPENDENCIES
The firm that is too-big-to-fail is really both big and integral to one
or more industries of critical importance to the overall economy (or as
one observer nicely put it, the “business ecosystem”). 35 American
Insurance Group, Inc. (“AIG”) provides an instructive example of a
company that was determined to “be too big to fail” based not only on
its size, but on other factors as well. It certainly was very big. AIG
operated in four major business lines: (i) general property and casualty
insurance, (ii) life insurance and retirement services, (iii) financial
services, and (iv) asset management. As of September 30, 2008, AIG
reported consolidated total assets in excess of $1 trillion and
stockholders’ equity of approximately $71 billion. In 2007, AIG’s life
and health insurance businesses ranked first in the United States
measured by net premiums written ($51.3 billion) and third in terms of
total assets at year-end ($364 billion). For the same period, AIG’s
property and casualty insurance businesses ranked second in the United
States measured by net premiums written ($35.2 billion) and third based
upon total assets at year-end ($124.5 billion). 36 It has been argued that

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 1.
See Too Big To Fail? The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Courts and
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Congress 9 (2009)
(statement of Albert A. Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute).
36. Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008: Restructuring of the Government’s Financial Support to the American
International Group, Inc. (Nov. 10, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/monetarypolicy/files/129aigrestructure.pdf.
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the solution to the to-big-to-fail problem, at least in the financial services
sector, should include limiting the size of firms like AIG so that any
single firm’s failure would present less systemic risk. 37
However, AIG’s size alone does not explain the perceived need for
its rescue, which, instead, stemmed from its vast commitments
throughout the global financial markets. It was feared that a default on
AIG’s commitments would have created a shock-wave effect across a
broad swath of economic activity. Those who were at risk from a failure
of AIG included large investors, small investors in money market
mutual funds (including retirement accounts), insurance policyholders
and claimants, state and local governments that had extended credit to
AIG, global commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial
institutions, as well as subsidiaries of AIG itself. AIG was a major
participant in the derivatives markets, as well as a significant
counterparty to a large number of major national and international
financial institutions. Out of credit swaps that had been sold by an AIG
division having a notional value of $372 billion, approximately $250
billion represented transactions designed to provide financial institutions
with regulatory capital relief. 38 AIG’s failure would have impaired or
even gutted the capital bases of many of the world’s largest financial
institutions. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Benjamin Bernanke
concluded, along with the Treasury Department, that:
At best, the consequences of AIG’s failure would have been a
significant intensification of an already severe financial crisis and a
further worsening of global economic conditions. Conceivably, its
failure could have resulted in a 1930s-style global financial and

37. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Are Some Institutions Too Big To Fail And If So, What
Should We Do About It?: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 60
(2009) (statement of Simon Johnson, Ronald Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, MIT
Sloan School of Management; Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics) (“[S]ome will complain about ‘efficiency costs’ from breaking up banks,
and they may have a point. But you need to weigh any such costs against the benefits of
no longer having banks that are too big to fail. Anything that is ‘too big to fail’ is now
‘too big to exist.’”) (emphasis added).
38. AIG REPORT, supra note 3, at 2,3; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE
SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES
AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT, at
7,8 (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/
129periodicupdate02252009.pdf.
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economic meltdown, with catastrophic implications for production,
39
income, and jobs.

On September 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve and Treasury agreed
to extend $85 billion in secured loans to AIG, an amount that
subsequently increased to more than double that amount. 40 The
objective was not merely to protect AIG from the normal processes of
bankruptcy, but to prevent a downward spiraling of the entire financial
services sector in the United States and globally. AIG’s elaborate,
unregulated and risky commitments cast a dark shadow across a network
of counterparties whose contractual interrelationships had created
mutual dependencies on a vast scale.
Interrelatedness is thus a characteristic of the too-big-to-fail firm,
whose mutual interdependencies are substantial in scope and incapable
of satisfactory resolution through bankruptcy. The extent of these
interdependencies seems important in distinguishing between firms that
are too big to fail and firms whose failures result in harsh but acceptable
consequences. Many large companies maintain interdependent relationships with many others, but only some of these reach levels that can
draw entire economic systems into potential collapse. Enron, for
example, was intricately interconnected and certainly was not in its own
solitary orbit when it failed. It was deeply interrelated in energy
markets, and its failure caused serious problems in entirely unrelated
markets, as well as in the natural gas market, where the prospect of
Enron’s contracts going unhonored sent shock waves through that
particular market. More immediately, its demise cost over 28,000
employees at Arthur Andersen’s U.S. operations their jobs and 1,750
Andersen partners lost most of their entire life savings. 41 However, the
extent of economic harm from Enron’s demise was contained without
government bailouts, and no threat across the economy as a whole was
perceived.
Thus, a firm that is too-big-to-fail is one whose
interdependencies extend so far that failure of the firm spells broader
39. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Testimony Before the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs. (March 24, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20090324a.htm.
40. Aaron Smith & David Goldman, Fed Reduces AIG’s Debt By $25 Million,
CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 1, 2009, 9:47 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/01/
news/companies/aig/index.htm.
41. See Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen Layoff to Hit Support Staff Hardest, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2002, at C1.
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failures that could harm the economy as a whole. Enron’s failure might
have brought about failures of a large number of natural gas traders, for
example, but the emanations for those failures would not have been
anything comparable to the global bank failures that would apparently
have resulted from a failure to rescue AIG.
C. SURROUNDING ECONOMIC CONTEXT
Defining a firm as too big to fail also requires consideration of
context, particularly the economic conditions surrounding the potential
failure. By the time AIG stood at the edge of failure, the financial
system, especially the credit markets, were already deeply troubled.
AIG’s counterparties included a significant part of the world’s credit
markets, and they in turn were very much at risk of collapse if AIG’s
commitments to them turned out to be worthless. Furthermore, AIG was
not alone in its perilous condition, and many of its largest counterparties
were weak or had already failed. When the United States loaned AIG
$85 billion on September 16, 2008, credit markets were already in
turmoil from the government’s takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
ten days earlier, and from the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on
September 15, 2008. 42 Other major financial institutions were under
stress, including, among others, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch. 43 The
risks of allowing AIG to file for bankruptcy in this context were
perceived as too great. As Chairman Bernanke testified before
Congress, the decision to invest in AIG was driven not just by AIG’s
role in the broader economic ecosystem, but by the economic context in
which the failure of AIG would have occurred absent government
intervention:
It was an extraordinary time. Global financial markets were
experiencing unprecedented strains and a worldwide loss of
confidence. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been placed into
conservatorship only two weeks earlier, and Lehman Brothers had
filed for bankruptcy the day before. We were very concerned about

42. Oversight of the Federal Government’s Intervention at American International
Group: Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 111th Congress 10 (2009) (statement of
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve System).
43. MURPHY, supra note 17, at 3-4.
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44

It follows from this testimony that the public policy makers who
decided that the government needed to invest in AIG probably would
not have taken that step in some other economic climates. Had credit
markets not already been strained, had Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Wachovia and
many other financial behemoths not been imperiled at the same moment,
there exists reason to doubt whether AIG failing all by itself would have
threatened the economy as a whole as it did. Thus, a company is not
simply too-big-to-fail in the abstract, but poses broader risks in some
contexts than others – some of these presenting unacceptable risks.

III. POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST LAW
AND THE “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” PROBLEM
The foregoing is not intended as an empirical study of the problem,
which would certainly be a worthy, but different, undertaking. 45 Rather,
identifying certain characteristics of firms whose failures presented
unacceptable consequences focuses the consideration on the problems
that antitrust would need to address to help mitigate or avoid the public
policy dilemmas posed by these impending business failures. It is with
this in mind that the partial list above was fashioned. Again, these
44. Oversight, supra note 43, at 71 (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman,
Federal Reserve System).
45. Nor is this analysis exhaustive. For example, another characteristic of a firm
that presents a too-big-to-fail problem might be the absence of certain types of
culpability. Public bailouts are unlikely to be considered in response to a failure
brought about by criminal misconduct on the part of corporate management. “Too-bigto-fail” problems often result from risky conduct, and indeed the problem is essentially
one of loss-shifting to the treasury and away from the corporate actors who took the
risks. When the risks that precipitate corporate collapse are substantially aggravated by
illegal or fraudulent conduct, however, relief sought from the government meets with an
additional layer of political resistance. Enron and WorldCom failed as a direct
consequence of conduct that was highly risky and which was unlawfully and
deliberately concealed in violation of civil and criminal securities laws, among others.
Fraud concealing their financial downturn allowed the risky conduct to persist until its
cumulative effects brought about irreversible failures. No serious consideration was
given to public bailouts. If criminality brings on a business collapse with devastating
collateral damage to the economy or investors, however, the resulting problem is more
directly addressed by means other than antitrust law.
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characteristics include: (1) size; (2) interrelatedness in the economic
ecosystem; and (3) surrounding economic context or events. Having
identified some common elements of the too-big-to-fail problem, it
begins to emerge why United States antitrust law as it is currently
understood and enforced might have, at most, very limited application to
help avert or solve future too-big-to-fail problems.
A. THE NARROW MODERN FOCUS OF U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
The current state of antitrust law is often referred to as embracing
“Post-Chicago School” economic theory. Post-Chicago School antitrust
is the stepchild of Chicago School antitrust, which represented a radical
departure from historic antitrust policy. As discussed later in this article,
antitrust policy (and thus antitrust law itself) has had a dynamic history,
changing rather dramatically in response to intellectual developments in
the field of economics and to changes in the economy itself. Early
antitrust decisions embraced a sweeping array of economic, political and
social policies. 46 A turn toward a less value-laden antitrust law began to
take shape in the 1970s, promoted by intellectual descendants of Oliver
Wendell Holmes. 47 Lawyers for corporate interests and industrial
organization economists of the Chicago School mounted an organized
effort that succeeded in persuading the federal courts to adopt a far
narrower view of antitrust that has as its single objective the avoidance
of economically inefficient transactions, referred to by economists as
“allocative efficiency.” 48 In the last two decades of the Twentieth
Century, antitrust law embraced this narrow, Chicago School, doctrinal
approach to antitrust law and accepted the optimization of allocative
efficiency of firms and markets as the dominant antitrust policy. 49 This

46.
47.

See infra Part 3.b.
For an interesting historical treatment of the legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes,
see ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF
JUSTICE HOLMES (2000).
48. See, Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1051; Peter M. Gerhart, The Supreme Court and
Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 319,
349 (1982); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13 (1977).
49. Allocative or economic efficiency of markets refers to the situation in which it
is impossible to generate a larger total societal welfare from the available resources
without technological advancement. Allocative efficiency differs from distributive
values or fairness. Chicago School proponents argue that economics should concern
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objective was advocated in some influential quarters as the exclusive
policy of the Sherman Act. For example, a leading proponent of the
Chicago School argued that the “whole task of antitrust can be summed
up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing
productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss
in consumer welfare.” 50 In the earliest phase of this revision and
reconstruction of antitrust law, Chicago School adherents persuaded
courts not only to restrict antitrust to the enforcement of efficient
markets, but, more radically, also persuaded them that markets whose
allocative efficiency is distorted by monopolistic or conspiratorial
misconduct tend to self-correct without great cost to society and, thus,
take greater benefit from judicial restraint than from costly and errorprone judicial intervention. 51
The Chicago School came to dominate judicial and federal agency
interpretations of the law, and played a central role in a string of
itself only with aggregate welfare rather than distributive welfare – i.e., how much
society produces at what cost, but not who gets it. The founder of the Chicago School
articulated its value-barren approach:
Why do economists object to monopoly? The purely ‘economic’ argument against
monopoly is very different from what noneconomists might expect. Successful
monopolists charge prices above what they would be with competition so that
customers pay more and the monopolists (and perhaps their employees) gain. It
may seem strange, but economists see no reason to criticize monopolies simply
because they transfer wealth from customers to monopoly producers. That is
because economists have no way of knowing who is the more worthy of the two
parties—the producer or the customer. Of course, people (including economists)
may object to the wealth transfer on other grounds, including moral ones. But the
transfer itself does not present an ‘economic’ problem. Rather, the purely
‘economic’ case against monopoly is that it reduces aggregate economic welfare
(as opposed to simply making some people worse off and others better off by an
equal amount). When the monopolist raises prices above the competitive level in
order to reap his monopoly profits, customers buy less of the product, less is
produced, and society as a whole is worse off. In short, monopoly reduces
society’s income.

George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1
(1982).
By defining economics as “value neutral,” and then pressing for purely
economics-driven antitrust law interpretations, the Chicago School sought to strip
antitrust of any role as referee over the fairness of markets or the distributive fairness of
the economy as a whole.
50. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91
(1993).
51. See Bell Atl. Corp., v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567-68 (2007); Credit Suisse
Sec., LLC v. Billings, 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2003).
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Supreme Court decisions overturning more liberal, time-worn,
precedents. 52 The elevation of allocative efficiency as the central goal of
antitrust became widely accepted, so much so that courts and
commentators often seem to believe that this had always been antitrust’s
exclusive concern. 53 Allocative efficiency is equated with consumer
welfare in the sense that consumers are best off in a market that achieves
optimum allocative efficiency – prices in such markets send accurate
signals to producers and innovators to yield optimum outcomes for
consumers. While the most extreme position, that no other policies
aside from consumer welfare have any relevance, was not adopted by
the courts, economic efficiency came to predominate to a large extent
and effectively displaced other policy objectives that at one time or
another were considered important considerations in the application of
antitrust law. During this Chicago School phase, antitrust enforcement
at the federal level was largely confined to unambiguous cartel activity
and blatantly problematic mergers, leaving more subtle misconduct to
marketplace self-corrections that the Chicago School doctrine
anticipated would always or nearly always solve problems better than
52. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120-21 (2009)
(overturning the price squeeze prohibition in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), based on “developments in economic theory and antitrust
jurisprudence since Alcoa”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 882 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911)); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 221 (1993) (overruling Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967)); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 n.12 (1977)
(overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
53. As a senior economist at the United States Department of Justice Antitrust
Division put it succinctly: “efficiency is the goal, competition is the process.” Kenneth
Heyer, Address before the Merger Task Force of the European Commission’s
Directorate General for Competition (Apr. 9, 2002); see also Lawrence Summers,
Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358 (2001), (“[I]t
needs to be remembered that the goal is efficiency, not competition. The ultimate goal
is that there be efficiency.”). The efficiency-oriented policy of competition law has also
gained favor in international circles largely at the insistence of United States policy
makers and scholars. For example, a 1996 report of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development affirmed that “the basic objective of competition policy
is to protect competition as the most appropriate means of ensuring the efficient
allocation of resources -- and thus efficient market outcomes -- in free market
economies.” OECD, Competition Policy and Efficiency Claims in Horizontal
Agreements, at 5, OECD/GD Doc. (96)65 (1996).
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antitrust courts. 54
Critics of the Chicago School found a number of flaws in the
theory, and also cautioned against elevating theory over facts in deciding
antitrust issues. Markets do not tend to follow theory neatly, and market
imperfections can confound the application of theory to the complex
factual settings that typically are encountered in antitrust matters. 55 A
new, more moderate “Post-Chicago School” approach thus emerged in
the early 1990s, 56 and eventually succeeded in establishing a somewhat
more tempered approach. Post-Chicago antitrust theory continues to
adhere to the limited objective of economic efficiency, but relies with
less assurance on market forces to correct interferences with market
competition.57 Although somewhat tempered as measured against the
early Chicago School, “Post-Chicago” antitrust theory departs from the
Chicago School views mostly around the margins. Post-Chicago
antitrust theory does not regard market concentration as an ill, let alone
an evil, in the absence of entry barriers; 58 it scrupulously distinguishes
abuse of monopoly power from vigorous successful competition by
dominant firms; 59 it broadly tolerates vertical price and non-price
restraints; 60 it regards predatory pricing as an unlikely source of
54. See Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 928 (1979).
55. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 473
(1992).
56. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230-49 (1986).
57. J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the
International Bar Association Antitrust Section Conference: I Say Monopoly, You Say
Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, Is It the
Economics? (Sept. 8, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/
070908isaymonopolyiba.pdf.
58. See e.g., JOHN S. MCGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971).
59. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of §
2 ‘can be difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate
competition, are myriad.’”) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
60. See e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890
(2007) (“The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for other
vertical restraints. Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate interbrand
competition -- the competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the
same type of product -- by reducing intrabrand competition -- the competition among
retailers selling the same brand. The promotion of interbrand competition is important
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consumer harm. 61 Under this theory, antitrust has retained as its primary
targets the more virulent forms of cartel activity and certain obviously
problematic merger activity.
Although “Post-Chicago” confidence in the self-correcting
tendencies of markets has dampened, it remains a persistent theme.
Recently, Joseph Schumpeter’s 1942 treatise Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy, which predicted the self-destruction of capitalism, has
enjoyed a surprising and influential revival, at least as to its
metaphorical description of the “gales of creative destruction.” 62
According to Schumpeter and his modern adherents, market participants
are understood to be, in many cases, competing for the market, rather
than within it, and competition on the basis of price is a poor heuristic to
explain how markets actually function. 63 Citing Schumpeter for a
position that is broadly tolerant of monopoly power as a lure toward
innovation, the (now former) Assistant Attorney General for antitrust
remarked in 2006 that “[t]he existence of firms with large market shares
does not necessarily or even typically reflect competitive harm—to the
contrary, firms typically obtain large market shares by offering products
that consumers prefer over other firms’ offerings.” 64
Thus, Post-Chicago antitrust theory remained skeptical of antitrust
intervention, but marginally less so than its more radical precedent in the
Chicago school. However, current antitrust law has been blunted by
concerns about so-called “Type One error” or over-enforcement of
because ‘the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of]
competition.’” (citations omitted).
61. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226
(1993). “As we have said in the Sherman Act context, ‘predatory pricing schemes are
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,’ and the costs of an erroneous finding of
liability are high. ‘[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing -lowering prices -- is the same mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition;
because ‘cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition . . . [;] mistaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because they chill the
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” (citations omitted).
62. See e.g., Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Opening Remarks before the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission: The
Gales of Creative Destruction: The Need for Clear and Objective Standards for
Enforcing Section 2 of the Sherman Act (June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/216738.htm.
63. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82-85
(1975).
64. Id. at 6.
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antitrust rules.
B. INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF POST-CHICAGO ANTITRUST AS A PUBLIC
POLICY TOOL TO ADDRESS TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL PROBLEMS
A preliminary consideration is thus whether current Post-Chicago
economics and antitrust policy could conceivably be applied to prevent
or unwind the existence of a too-big-to-fail firm, or to prevent its actual
or impending failure. On its face, this seems a doubtful proposition.
The central purpose of modern antitrust law is the protection of
consumer welfare, specifically price, output and innovation. 65 It has
been suggested that the actual or even potential collapse of a too-big-tofail firm implicates consumer welfare, 66 and does so in a manner that
existing antitrust law principles might address by application of Section
7 of the Clayton Act 67 to the mergers and other business combinations
that create these behemoths, or perhaps by application of Sections 1 or 2
of the Sherman Act. 68
For example, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) has speculated that “mergers should arguably be
examined with an eye toward whether they are creating a merged entity
that is ‘too big to fail.’ If so, the transaction may violate Section 7 (or
Section 1).” 69 Commissioner Rosch’s point was not the trivial one that
some mergers that create very big combinations may violate the
standards set forth in existing law or policy statements by exceeding
Instead, Commissioner Rosch
tolerable concentration levels. 70
articulated the view that it is at least possible, without amending the law,
to interpret existing antirust law to protect against some instances of the
sorts of business collapse that result in traditional forms of consumer

65. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 221 (noting the antitrust laws’ “traditional
concern for consumer welfare and price competition”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a
‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979))).
66. See Rosch, supra note 20.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.
69. See Rosch, supra note 20.
70. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html
[hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
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harm, such as reduced output, when an entire industry is hobbled.
Furthermore, since antitrust laws addressing mergers are
prophylactic, the argument extends not only to cleaning up a too-big-tofail problem, which comes too late to protect consumers, but, more
ambitiously, to prevent the problem before it bubbles up. Since the
failure of a too-big-to-fail firm would unavoidably reduce economic
activity, and thus output, for a protracted period of time and might also
eliminate or restrict investments in R&D (so goes the argument), 71
antitrust policy should address itself to this general area of public
concern. That is, if the failure of a too-big-to-fail firm could bring about
the sorts of consumer harm that the antitrust laws protect against, then
antitrust law might be implicated by the emergence of such firms in the
first place, before they fail.
The argument is appealing, but has apparent limitations. First, not
all consumer harm in the form of higher prices, reduced output or
diminished innovation implicates antitrust policy because these harms
sometimes are brought about by mechanisms that antitrust is not
concerned with. Consumers have certainly suffered a variety of
hardships from the financial meltdown, including evictions from their
homes, 72 loss of jobs, 73 disappearing retirement savings, 74 higher prices
for certain types of credit, 75 and generally diminished output throughout
the economy. 76 These harms were, to a large degree, precipitated by the
mismanagement of too-big-to-fail banks and other financial institutions.
However, are these antitrust harms? Not obviously, anyway, and
antitrust law deliberately has been limited to avoid extending antitrust
remedies to every sort of conduct that may harm consumers – they must
be harmed in particular ways that are quite narrow. For example,
consumers also suffered economic harms when the attacks on September
11, 2001 led to (among other more horrible consequences) the
71.
72.

Rosch, supra note 20.
John Leland, As Owners Feel Mortgage Pain, So Do Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
18, 2007, at A1.
73. JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNEMPLOYMENT: ISSUES
IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 1 (2011).
74. Kelly Evans, U.S. News: Ranks of Older Workers Swell as Losses Shorten
Retirement, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009, at A2.
75. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE SMALL
BUSINESS CREDIT CRUNCH AND THE IMPACT OF THE TARP 15-17 (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-051310-report.pdf.
76. GRAVELLE ET AL., supra note 74, at 3.
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immediate grounding of all air traffic within the United States, thus
reducing output in the air transportation markets 77 – but no one could
argue that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed violated the antitrust laws by
restraining trade in those markets. The mechanism by which output was
affected by terrorist attacks was different from the sort of activity that
antitrust is intended to prevent. 78
Antitrust law seeks to prevent antitrust injury, and courts have
narrowly construed the “antitrust injury” element of an antitrust case to
mean injury flowing from conduct that violates antitrust rules of
conduct, which prohibit, for example, price fixing. 79 On this basis,
courts have limited antitrust remedies to redress only certain types of
reasonably well-understood categories of marketplace misconduct, so
that flying an airplane into the World Trade Center does not count
regardless of its intended and actual consequences for the economy.
Thus, one challenge with addressing antitrust law to the too-big-to-fail
problem is to connect the requisite sorts of consumer harm with the sorts
of anticompetitive mechanisms that antitrust law cares about. Being big
or about to fail are not obviously among these anticompetitive
mechanisms since antitrust is not a status offense. Beyond that, even
being very big and taking what turn out to be poorly considered risks are
not obviously antitrust offenses either because that is not the sort of
conduct antitrust seeks to prevent – at least not under Post-Chicago
antitrust. Thus, as a starting point, antitrust intervention to prevent toobig-to-fail problems could not prevent the collapse of a firm that would
not cause any sort of antitrust injury to consumers or that caused such
harm via the wrong mechanisms.
An additional limitation of Post-Chicago antitrust is its
preoccupation with so-called Type One errors, or over-deterrence. For
example, in Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
the Supreme Court was centrally motivated by its desire to avoid
77. Ryan Tam & R. John Hansman, Impact of Air Transportation on Regional
Economic and Social Connectivity in the United States 1 (American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 2002), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/
bitstream/handle/1721.1/35884/atio_tamhansman.pdf?sequence=1.
78. See generally, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (“Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.”).
79. See FTC v. Sup. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
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punishing price cutting behavior that might be predatory, coupled with
any perceivable risk of simultaneously discouraging price cutting that is
competitive, when it redefined, and all but eliminated, the offense of
predatory pricing. It found that “[a]s a general rule, the exclusionary
effect of prices above a relevant measure of cost either reflects the lower
cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on
the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to
control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price
cutting.” 80
Such preoccupation with Type One errors also reaches other
antitrust cases beyond the predatory pricing context. The case that
extended the Brooke rule to predatory bidding evoked an amicus brief
from the Antitrust Division that, along with several of its other amicus
briefs, evidenced the same preoccupation with the “false positive”
problem and over-deterrence. 81 In that case, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Justice Department, again reciting “intolerable risks of chilling
Most recently, the Court
legitimate procompetitive conduct.” 82
introduced a new rule to bar most “price squeeze” claims, again citing
this same “intolerable risk” of false positives, and again supported by the
Antitrust Division’s refrain that “the risk of imposing liability in cases
involving procompetitive price-cutting, and ‘the costs of [such] an
erroneous finding of liability are high,’. . . because such errors (or ‘false
positives’) would ‘chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed
to protect.’” 83 In another decision that recites this same policy basis, the
Court all but eviscerated the essential facilities doctrine along with the
Second Circuit’s “monopoly leveraging” rule.
It reasoned that
“[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are
especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect.’” 84 Here too, the Antitrust Division, along with
80. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223
(1993).
81. “[A] broader rule could lead to ‘false positives’ and thereby ‘chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’” Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Weyerhaueser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312 (2007) (No. 85-381).
82. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312,
325 (2007).
83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Pac.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) (No. 07-512).
84. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
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the Federal Trade Commission, encouraged the result, urging that the
doctrine “encourages litigants to seek antitrust remedies for ordinary
commercial and regulatory disputes” – in other words, the doctrine chills
competitive conduct. 85 From this policy perspective, a number of
antitrust rules have been relaxed or even eliminated.
When one considers the conduct that Post-Chicago antitrust
prohibits against the backdrop of the characteristics of a too-big-to-fail
firm, it becomes apparent that current antitrust principles have very
limited application to the problem. This is not to say there is no room
for productive antitrust intervention, but, realistically, there is very little.
C. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING ANTITRUST RULES TO THE TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL FIRM
Among the attributes of a too-big-to-fail company identified above,
the “bigness” attribute seems the most obvious subject for antitrust
policy. There are three main impediments in the way of applying
modern antitrust law to prevent bigness of the too-big-to-fail sort. First,
allocative efficiency tends to favor or, at most, be neutral to bigness.
Since the vast scale of the too-big-to-fail enterprise is an essential
ingredient of the problem, antitrust’s modern ambivalence or outright
resistance to controlling bigness poses one problem. A second problem
is that of the self-inflicted wound: antitrust opposes monopolistic
misconduct, mergers or collusion, but it does not oppose the selfdestruction of a dominant firm, even where the same sort of consumer
harm or allocative inefficiency results. Third, prophylactic antitrust
rules are timid about speculating, and the too-big-to-fail problem is
layered in just the sort of contingencies that antitrust precedents resist to
predict. If antitrust is to have a meaningful role in containing the
problem of catastrophic business failures, it will need to overcome these
three problems.
1. The Bigness Problem
The approach that antitrust law currently takes toward bigness

398, 414 (2004).
85. Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004)
(No. 02-682).
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creates the first of these limitations. Antitrust as currently understood
has no particular antipathy towards large-scale enterprise. In fact, on
balance, antitrust tends to encourage large-scale enterprise.
It
recognizes that the potential economies of scale attainable by large
enterprises may create increased efficiencies, which can benefit
consumers. 86 Thus, where economies of scale may be involved, modern
antitrust law exercises caution before condemning large enterprises. 87
For example, economies of scale may (like other efficiencies)
constitute a defense to a merger challenge. 88 In evaluating a hospital
merger under the Clayton Act, 89 an appellate court noted that the
“evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more efficient . . . will
provide better medical care than either of [the merging] hospitals could
separately. The merged entity will be able to attract more highly
qualified physicians and specialists and to offer integrated delivery and
some tertiary care . . . The evidence shows that the merged entity may
well enhance competition.” 90 Of course, it was of no consequence in
that case that the merged firm’s ability to attract the best doctors might
adversely affect other hospitals, or that its size might make the firm
indispensible to the community so that its failure could never be
tolerated. In the context of a single firm with monopoly power, antitrust
law does not inhibit its taking advantage of economies of scale even
where smaller rivals are disadvantaged as a result. 91

86. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 287 (1985) (“The cooperative arrangement thus permits the
participating retailers to achieve economies of scale in purchasing and warehousing that
would otherwise be unavailable to them.”).
87. Id. (collusion and joint ventures); see also, MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71;
FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (scale economies
recognized as a cognizable efficiency in antitrust merger analysis).
88. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71; United States v. Long Island Jewish
Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
89. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain mergers and acquisitions whose
effects may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce. 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 18 (2010).
90. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999).
91. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005);
see also, Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In
determining whether conduct may be characterized as exclusionary, it is relevant to
consider its impact on consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an
unnecessarily restrictive way. If a firm has been attempting to exclude rivals on some
basis other than efficiency, it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory [or
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A merger is not the only setting in which antitrust champions scale
efficiencies. At the retail level, economies of scale constitute a
legitimate reason for a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition by
imposing vertical restraints. 92 Antitrust law also generally tolerates
combinations of competitors into joint ventures to achieve economies of
scale, with the presence of such efficiencies removing a challenge from
the application of per se condemnation and establishing a facially
plausible justification for the concerted activity. 93 Removing conduct
from per se illegality comes close to legalizing it, given the rarity of
plaintiff successes in challenging the conduct under the rule of reason. 94
Thus, modern antitrust law tends to encourage, rather than
discourage, bigness. In fact, its focus on allocative efficiency renders
this consequence unsurprising. A firm achieving scale economies
produces greater output at lower cost. That other competitors might be
devastated in the process is not a modern antitrust concern. Nor is it of
any concern that scale efficiency may result in indispensability to the
marketplace.
Only in the most indirect way does modern antitrust law discourage
bigness by imposing somewhat more stringent standards on firms that
have market power (which sometimes equates to bigness, although not
always) or that operate in oligopoly markets (in which the small number
of rivals sometimes means that they are large, but not always). The

exclusionary.] However, merely because an entity has monopoly power, does not bar it
from taking advantage of its scale of economies because of its size. Such advantages are
a consequence of size and not the exercise of monopoly power.”) (citations omitted).
92. “A purpose to facilitate point-of-sale services or to protect minimum economies
of scale could induce a manufacturer to limit intrabrand competition. Notwithstanding
price effects, such limitations are lawful when reasonable and not subject to automatic
condemnation.” Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 746
(1988) (quoting 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1457, 174-75 (1986)).
93. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985).
94. One rare successful challenge under the rule of reason is found in Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005), a case that is indicative of the
difficulties plaintiffs face under Post-Chicago School antitrust rules. In that case the
FTC challenged an agreement between competing record companies to suspend
advertising and discounting of two record albums temporarily during the launch period
for a jointly-produced recording. The court affirmed the FTC’s application of the rule
of reason to the challenged agreement, even though it involved competitors agreeing not
to put specific products on sale for a period of time – a collusive restriction on price and
advertising that in an earlier era probably would have met with per se condemnation.

290

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

existence of monopoly power is not unlawful by itself, but Section 2 of
the Sherman Act imposes different, more stringent, standards of conduct
on firms that have (or threaten to achieve) market power. 95 Moreover,
antitrust law imposes a different set of rules on the conduct of large
monopolies. Section 1 of the Sherman Act sometimes imposes more
stringent standards on firms in highly concentrated markets, or at least
exposes them to antitrust risks that probably inhibit a certain amount of
marketplace conduct than would otherwise occur. 96 Firms operating in a
market with an oligopolistic structure are subject to certain limitations
on their behavior, and may more easily be found to have engaged in
unlawful price fixing or tacit collusion than firms in more diffuse
markets. For instance, “a showing of parallel business behavior is
admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact finder may infer
agreement” in a Sherman Act conspiracy case. 97 While such parallel
conduct alone is not enough to support a conspiracy complaint, 98 the
potential exposure to antitrust remedies can discourage firms in an
oligopolistic market from acting as freely as they might in a more
competitive one. This holds particularly true if firms interact through
trade associations or in other contexts that would add to the inference of
Thus, antitrust law imposes certain burdens on
agreement. 99
monopolists and oligopolists, and, to this limited extent, can be seen as
disfavoring these market structures.
However, it is one thing to demand higher standards of conduct in
monopolistic and concentrated markets, and quite another to discourage
the existence of big firms. First, size and market power are not the same
thing, such that many big firms do not have market power that would
even implicate the constraints of heightened antitrust scrutiny. These
constraints apply to some big firms, but not all, and can also apply to
small firms. Indeed, monopolies can be large, but they can also be small
by any measure, such as a monopoly held by virtue of a patent over a
small but essential input, or in a market that can sustain only a single

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
See id.
See e.g., Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998
F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a range of circumstantial evidence can show
collusion; “[f]or example, have they attended meetings or conducted discussions at
which they had the opportunity to conspire…?”).
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small seller, such as the local baker in a village without any others. 100
More importantly, the possibility of encountering more stringent
antitrust conduct rules would not plausibly lead firms to control their
own size. The economic inducements for growth and market power are
compelling, and, in some cases, vast size can be obtained without even
implicating antitrust rules, such as by conglomerate or out-of-market
acquisition activity. It seems unlikely that a firm would decide, for
example, to forego an opportunity to increase its size and market share
on the thin ground that doing so would require it to exercise more
caution when attending trade association meetings.
Market extension combinations that do not even implicate antitrust
rules have fueled growth in key sectors of the economy. The banking
industry, one that is central to the too-big-to-fail crisis, provides an
excellent example. The banking industry transformed itself from
relatively small and local enterprises to global giants through merger
activity and relaxed regulation. Between 1980 and 1999, the number of
commercial banks declined from approximately 15,000 to just 9,000.
The trend toward concentration continued into the new century. At the
end of 2000, there were 397 banks with assets of $1 billion or more; by
mid-2009 there were 136 more of these large banks, and at the same
time, the total number of commercial banks dropped by approximately
1,320. 101 The concentration of the banking industry provoked almost no
antitrust intervention. Bank mergers implicate antitrust laws only when
they combine competing banks with overlapping geographic reach. 102
The biggest bank mergers often involved little in the way of competitive
100.
101.
102.

See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
Statistics on Banking, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/SOB/.
For example, the proposed merger of PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. with
National City Corporation was approved by the Antitrust Division of the United States
Department of Justice on the condition that the parties divest a total of 61 branches in
western Pennsylvania with approximately $4.1 billion in deposits, as well as certain
middle-market lending operations of National City Bank in the region. Thus, in the
area of their most significant competitive overlap, the merger implicated antitrust rules
pertaining to mergers and triggered the imposition of the divestiture remedy. Even with
this structural remedy, however, the merger created the nation’s fifth largest bank with
$289 billion in assets and about $180 billion in total deposits. The $4.1 billion
divestiture represented only a little more than 2% of the merging parties aggregate
deposits. See Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Department
Requires Divestitures in Acquisition of National City Corporation by PNC Financial
Services Group (Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2008/240315.pdf.
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overlap and were waived through by antitrust and banking regulators
without conditions or with minimal divestitures imposed as conditions
for these approvals. 103 Thus, antitrust does not deter the existence of big
firms by treating those with market power somewhat differently than
those without it.
What is missing from antitrust is any real discipline against the vast
attenuated size and shape of the too-big-to-fail company. Antitrust law
contains no prohibition against size, and, instead, modern antitrust law
probably coddles, more than it impedes, corporate expansion.
2. The Self-Inflicted Wound Problem
The second difficulty with resorting to antitrust law to prevent
colossal failures is that antitrust conduct standards do not restrict risk
taking activity, even if the risks are obviously ill-advised. A violation of
antitrust law inflicts a wound on consumers and perhaps on rivals, but
not on the actor. All aspects of antitrust law prohibitions concur in this
respect. For example, monopoly law prohibits certain forms of
predatory and exclusionary conduct by dominant firms that harm
consumers and market competition by weakening or destroying the
monopolist’s rivals or preventing their emergence into the
marketplace. 104 Merger prohibitions seek to prevent the acquisition of
monopoly power for the same ultimate purpose. 105 Similarly, conspiracy
antitrust prohibitions target the combined exercise of market power to
harm competition. 106 No antitrust prohibition directs itself against harm
a firm inflicts on itself. 107 Rather, antitrust economics proceeds on the
103. See generally, Yomarie Silva, Note, The “Too Big to Fail” Doctrine and the
Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 115 (2009).
104. “The conduct that § 2 brands as anticompetitive must… cause or threaten harm
to consumers from lower market output, higher prices, reduced innovation, or some
other indicator of diminished competitiveness.” P. E. AREEDA AND H. HOVENKAMP,
FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 6.04 (2d ed. 2003).
105. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, §1 (“[M]ergers should not be
permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise... A
merger enhances market power if it is likely to encourage one or more firms to raise
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of
diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”).
106. See, e.g., U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (holding
that the Sherman Act is directed, among other things, against combinations of power to
control prices even in a “substantial part of the commerce in [a] commodity.”)
107. Some antitrust violations involve agreements that restrict the freedom of firms
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assumption that all firms seek to maximize profits. In order to maximize
profits, firms must decide how much to produce and sell, and how to
produce and sell it – that is, they must decide how to compete. If a firm
decides to take a risk in that endeavor, antitrust courts will not secondguess it to block the taking of that risk ex ante or to punish it ex post.
Antitrust fosters competition only by keeping it open, not by preventing
it or directing companies in how to succeed or at least avoid failure.
The too-big-to-fail firm threatens the economy by virtue of the
wounds it inflicted upon itself, rather than by virtue of the wounds it
inflicted on others for its own advancement. Thus, the essential feature
of a firm that has become too big to fail is that it has somehow
threatened its own economic survival, generally by taking ill-advised
risks or pursuing a disastrous business strategy. If such a firm fails, it is,
by definition, inefficient in the sense that the resources dedicated to the
firm produced poor results. However, supporting an inefficient
participant’s existence in a market and averting its failure serves no
antitrust objectives, even when the failure of such a firm would harm
consumers by eliminating that firm’s rivalry. If, instead, such a firm
exits its market, thereby leaving its last standing rival with a monopoly,
it is not the case (nor should it be) that the exiting firm violated the
antitrust laws by closing up shop. True, its conduct created a monopoly,
but it created a monopoly in another firm rather than for itself. Yet,
absent a collusive deal in which the firm receives payment to exit the
market, the mere act of departure is not illegal. To hold otherwise
would impose a sort of Iron Curtain around markets, forbidding
departures on pain of civil or even criminal prosecution.
Thus, antitrust law is directed at conduct that harms other firms, and
not self-inflicted wounds that characterize the too-big-to-fail firm. This
creates a moral hazard problem, spurring the firm that is too big to fail to
take risks that fall on someone other than the firm, and also leading to
excessive and inefficient risk taking. However, antitrust law is simply
not directed at preventing even mindless leaps toward profits, even if the
results of such conduct may very well inflict catastrophic consumer

to expand their market share by competing, and in some sense thus involve what might
be regarded as self-inflicted harm. A market allocation or similar such restraint,
however, is intended on balance to be profitable for the conspirators, and so impose no
net harm on them. The too-big-to-fail firm is one that is approaching collapse, and
antitrust rules do not prohibit companies from collapsing.

294

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

harm.
3. The Incipiency Problem
A final problem with the application of existing antitrust rules to the
too-big-to-fail problem is the incipiency issue. Mostly, antitrust law
applies post hoc to condemn past conduct that has already interfered
impermissibly with competitive markets. Furthermore, standing and
antitrust injury remedial standards for private litigation require proof
that both the marketplace and the plaintiff suffered harm.108 Thus, most
antitrust prohibitions do not reach incipient problems at all, and those
few that do only apply to likely or probable violations. For example, the
standard for assessing most claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
the Rule of Reason, evaluates whether concerted action has had a net
anticompetitive effect taking into account the history and nature of the
restraint. 109 This standard scrutinizes alleged offenses under Section 1
for past actual effects rather than projected future effects.
There are, of course, antitrust statutes applicable to prevent
incipient harm. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any transaction
“where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 110
It seeks to forestall anticompetitive mergers “in their incipiency,” before
their effects occur, and thus requires a prediction about the merger’s
impact on future competition. 111 Proving a Section 7 violation does not
require showing that a merger has caused higher prices in the affected
market, but, rather, “that the merger create an appreciable danger of such
consequences in the future. A predictive judgment, necessarily
probabilistic and judgmental rather than demonstrable is called for.” 112
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act also has prospective as
well as post hoc reach. 113 It has long been established that the FTC can
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007).
15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (2010).
See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).
Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986).
15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (2010) (“(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful.”) Subsection (2) empowers the Commission to “prevent
persons… from using unfair methods of competition….” but excludes, among other
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challenge as an unfair method of competition prohibited by Section 5
any conduct that would be unlawful under the antitrust laws, as well as
conduct that threatens to become a violation. Thus, in FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Servs. Co., 114 the Supreme Court concluded that the
Commission can proceed under Section 5 to prohibit in their incipiency
practices that threatened to become a Sherman Act violation when fully
grown. Subsequently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
Commission challenges under Section 5 without requiring proof of
market power or anticompetitive effects, affirming the FTC’s “power
under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.” 115 Finally, the
prohibition in Section 2 of the Sherman Act against attempted
monopolization reaches incipient problems, condemning conduct that
presents a dangerous likelihood of successful monopolization. 116 As
Justice Holmes observed in Swift & Co. v. United States:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which
the law seeks to prevent — for instance, the monopoly — but require
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that
result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to
produce a dangerous probability that it will happen . . . But when that
intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute,
like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs
itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the
117
completed result.

A too-big-to-fail problem is one of layered contingencies. As
explored above, one element of a too-big-to-fail problem is the broader
economic context in which a company’s imminent threatened failure
occurs. At the time when firms like AIG and Bear Sterns were rescued,
many other economic problems of national scope had already
accumulated before the bailout decisions had to be made. 118 It is
uncertain, if not doubtful, whether the bailout of any single firm would
have been considered a pressing need had the surrounding circumstances
been less threatening. In any event, a firm is only in the requisite sense
too-big-to-fail if it is very big and deeply integral to broader economic
industries, banking from the reach of this power.
114. 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953).
115. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillen, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993).
116. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
117. Id. at 396.
118. MURPHY, supra note 17, at 2-4.
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activity that depends upon it, and also if there are economic conditions
surrounding the corporate crisis rendering the imminent failure
unacceptably catastrophic. If AIG was too big to allow its demise in the
fall of 2008 when these problems coalesced, was it also “too big” during
the housing boom that was in full bloom just months earlier? Had it
failed in 2006, would the government have had any reason to intervene
to prevent collapse? At what point along the pathway towards a fullblown catastrophe does the incipient problem become palpable enough
to raise the specter of bailouts or some alternative governmental
intervention? By the same token, at what point could antitrust
intervention, if it is available, be expected to kick in? The point of
intervention would not be to punish or exact damages, but to prevent
catastrophe. However, any intervention, whether from antitrust or other
sources, would face significant difficulties anticipating the contingencies
involved, including the potential for an adverse turn of events in the
broader economic context and the likely effects of a particular
company’s interrelations with others in the event that it failed.
Moreover, antitrust law, in particular, is limited by various doctrines that
preclude intervention based on speculation.119
Even the antitrust statutes with some preventive reach are of limited
use in forestalling a catastrophic business collapse because the narrow
range of possibilities against which Post-Chicago substantive antitrust
guards barely overlaps with the possibilities that a catastrophic potential
failure portend. For antitrust incipiency statutes to intervene to avert a
too-big-to-fail scenario would require an imminent threat of the right
sort. Under existing antitrust laws that are based on Post-Chicago
assumptions, it is theoretically possible that intervention could happen,
but it will be the unusual case to be sure. Section 2’s prohibition against

119. For example, causation and standing in antitrust jurisprudence are restrictive
concepts, limiting damage claims to plaintiffs whose injuries are direct. In Assoc. Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), the
Court held that a union lacked standing to challenge a boycott against unionized firms
on the ground that the injury was too indirect and speculative, notwithstanding that
there was not real doubt that the boycott had injured union firms. See LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK
925 (2000). Similarly, the indirect purchaser damages exclusion established in Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), denies a damages remedy to indirect
purchasers from a price-fixing cartel again without serious doubt that downstream
customers are often harmed, but out of concern for burdening federal courts with
imponderable antitrust damages apportionment problems. Id. at 478-79.
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attempted monopolization seems of no possible application outside the
coincidental circumstance in which a very big company is both headed
for a train wreck and happens, at the same time, to be conducting its
business with unlawful intent and the likely effect of maintaining or
creating a monopoly. This case will be the exceptional circumstance
almost by definition: a company is unlikely to become a monopoly at the
same time as it is likely to fail. The more plausible candidates for
intercepting a too-big-to-fail failure are Section 5 of the FTC Act and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
4. The Current Reach of Section 5 of the FTC Act
Is it, or could it be, a violation of Section 5 for a company to engage
in some form of risky conduct that poses a threat to its own survival and
creates a strong possibility of governmental protection or bailout? If so,
at what point in time along the continuum of events would that conduct
rise to the level of an “unfair method of competition”? Is it “unfair” in
the requisite sense for a firm to take unreasonable risks that its smaller
rivals cannot afford to take given an imbalance in the likelihood of
governmental rescue for the “too-big-to-fail” company?
Section 5 is an adaptable statute by its nature. It proscribes “unfair
methods of competition,” which the Supreme Court has found to be a
concept that is “flexible . . . with evolving content.” 120 The Court has
repeatedly held that the meaning of “unfair methods of competition” can
be ascertained only on a case-by-case basis by the “gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion.” 121 The results of judicial articulation
of the concept have been inconclusive and spotty, but a few points have
emerged. First, Section 5 prohibits whatever is also prohibited by the
antitrust laws (subject to certain jurisdictional limitations of the FTC
Act). 122 However, Section 5 is not confined to conduct that violates
antitrust law:

120.
121.
122.

FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
FTC v. Raladam Co., 284 U.S. 643, 648 (1931).
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986); United States v. Am.
Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 279 n.7 (1975); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316, 321-22 (1966); Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 609
(1953); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953), reh’g
denied, 345 U.S. 914 (1953); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 690, 693 (1948),
reh’g denied, 334 U.S. 839 (1948).
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In the area of anticompetitive practices, the FTC Act functions as a
kind of penumbra around the federal antitrust statutes. An
anticompetitive practice need not violate the Sherman Act or the
Clayton Act in order to violate the FTC Act . . . However, the scope
of the FTC is nonetheless linked to the antitrust laws. The power of
the Federal Trade Commission to declare anticompetitive trade
practices “unfair” extends primarily to “trade practices which
conflict with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
123
even though such practices may not actually violate those laws.”

Thus, conduct that may fall outside the reach of the antitrust laws
for technical reasons may violate Section 5, such as an invitation to fix
prices where no agreement to do so is actually formed. 124 Moreover,
since as long ago as 1972, the Supreme Court has held that conduct that
does not implicate antitrust law or policy may fall within the potential
reach of Section 5:
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to
itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but
congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of
equity, considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the
125
letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.

The sweep of Section 5’s “unfair methods of competition” has been
regarded as a broad grant of authority that affords the agency power to
intervene to protect the public against practices that may defy
categorization. For example, a company using deceptive advertising,
intentionally or not, that other companies complying with the Act do not
use, creates an unfair advantage over its competitors. 126 Conduct that is
legally proper, such as bringing lawsuits in courts of proper venue, has
been held to be an unfair method of competition where the defendants in
those lawsuits were consumers who were disadvantaged by having to
travel long distances to defend themselves against the plaintiff

123. Chuck’s Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (4th
Cir. 1987) (dictum) (quoting Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. at 321).
124. See In re Quality Trailer Prods., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,247 (Aug. 11,
1992); see also In re YKK (U.S.A.), Inc., 58 Fed. Reg. 19,454 (Apr. 14, 1993), 58 Fed
Reg. 41,790 (Aug. 5, 1993) (consent decree); In re AE Clevite, Inc., 58 Fed. Reg.
17,405 (Apr. 2, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 35,459 (July 1, 1993) (consent decree).
125. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972).
126. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 1967).
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corporation’s charges. 127 However, courts have imposed limitations on
the scope of Section 5 in the interest of predictability, especially where
the conduct is outside the reach of antitrust laws. Where “unfairness” is
applied to conduct that is not measurable by unfairness standards under
other statutes, “standards for determining whether it is ‘unfair’ within
the meaning of § 5 must be formulated to discriminate between normally
acceptable business behavior and conduct that is unreasonable or
unacceptable.” 128
The conduct that creates a too-big-to-fail problem can fall into an
infinite variety of categories, some of which Section 5 intervention
might theoretically reach. First, of course, growth is often accomplished
by mergers and acquisitions. The antitrust standard for such a
transaction is only implicated where market power is increased, but
Section 5 could reach further. For example, the FTC might block a
conglomerate merger on the grounds that the scale efficiencies or other
putative benefits from the combination are outweighed by looming
indispensability problems, particularly if the moral hazard created by the
merger gave the merging firms an unfair advantage over smaller rivals
who could not rely on bailouts.
The market extension mergers in the banking industry, again,
provide an excellent example. Suppose that Bank A is the dominant
commercial bank in Region A, and it acquires Banks B, C and D, which
each dominate in their respective Regions B, C and D. By hypothesis,
none of these banks competes with the others, such that the merger is not
horizontal and likely does not provoke any resistance under Section 7. 129
While the failure of pre-merger Bank A standing alone might pose a
significant but manageable clean-up problem for the Federal Reserve
System, at some point, that will no longer be the case if Bank A merges
with enough dominant banks in enough geographic markets.
Eventually, market extension mergers can and do create banks that
cannot be allowed to fail. If it is additionally supposed that it would be
economically rational for post-merger Bank A to take advantage of its
too-big-to-fail status, such as by engaging in high-risk-high-return

127.
128.
129.

Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 294 (1976).
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
For purposes of antitrust analysis, geographic market extension mergers are
essentially no different from product market extension mergers. In 1998, for example,
Citi Group acquired Travelers, extending its banking business into the business of
insurance.
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lending on a global scale with the expectation of federal rescue if risks
materialize, is that an “unfair method of competition”? If so, are the
mergers that position Bank A to engage in that unfair method of
competition also unfair, or is it too speculative even for the incipiency
standards of Section 5? There is no case authority to resolve this, but at
least one current Commissioner controversially believes that Section 5
plausibly applies. 130
5. Consolidation, Efficiency and the Current Reach
of Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, containing the principal federal
statutory provision governing mergers, provides that:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
131
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.

As currently understood, Section 7 of the Clayton Act represents no
particular objection to size, and instead concerns itself with
combinations that create market power or facilitate its exercise. Policy
makers have sometimes toyed with the idea of limiting mergers of large
and leading companies, but those proposals have not been implemented
or enacted into law.132 Indeed, the failed attempts to outlaw mergers
exceeding specified size thresholds make clear that existing law does not

130.
131.
132.

See Rosch, supra note 20, at 8.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2010).
See, e.g., Phil C. Neal, REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON
ANTITRUST POLICY, 115 CONG. REC. 13,890 (1969) (recommending limiting certain
acquisitions by firms having $250 million in sales or $500 million in assets of leading
firms in concentrated markets; in 1979 a bill was introduced in the Senate that would
have prohibited mergers between a companies with sales or assets exceeding $2 billion
as well as smaller mergers in concentrated markets); Donald I. Baker & Karen L.
Grimm, S. 600 – An Unnecessary and Dangerous Foray into Classic Populism, 40 OHIO
ST. L. J. 847 (1979).
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prohibit such transactions. 133 Section 7 instead limits aggregations of
market power, rather than size – and the two do not correlate.
Conglomerate mergers can be very large without affecting concentration
in any relevant economic market, and thus very large mergers are
permitted in very large markets.
The most influential interpretation of this broadly-worded statute is
embodied in federal agency guidelines rather than judicial opinions,
largely because the Supreme Court has only rarely taken cases that
would allow it to expand on the statute’s meaning. 134 As the Merger
Guidelines make clear at the outset: “The unifying theme of the
Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise. . . . [T]he result of the exercise
of market power is a transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers or a
misallocation of resources.” 135 The evaluation of the legality of a
merger under the 1992 Guidelines, which is also generally followed by
the courts, proceeds by defining the relevant markets in which the
transaction may increase concentration and then by measuring its
concentration effects, taking certain defenses and justifications into
account as to transactions that otherwise exceed stated permissible
concentration thresholds. Nothing in the case law or the 1992
Guidelines addresses the problem of unwieldy size or the possibility that
the resulting firm might wield intolerable political power or present
unacceptable risks of its own failure. Size does not constitute a valid
basis for disapproving a merger under the Guidelines analysis, and so it
is no surprise to find that mergers of enormous size are routinely
approved by antitrust enforcers and federal courts applying Section 7.

133. In response to the current crisis, legislation has been proposed to enable
regulators to dismantle or impose discipline on any firm that poses a too-big-to-fail risk.
A proposal by Congressman Kanjorski of Pennsylvania would empower a newlycreated financial industry regulatory Council to make determinations about the size,
scope of operations, business relationships and interconnectedness, and mix of activities
of the largest financial services businesses and to impose, among other things,
divestiture to unaffiliated companies upon a finding of systemic risk. This provision
would not amend Section 7 but might cast a different light on it. H. Amdt. 527, 111th
Cong. (2009) (unenacted).
134. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71. The Supreme Court’s most recent
antitrust merger case was in 1990, and concerned remedies of private parties under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act rather than substantive standards. California v. Am.
Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
135. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 0.1.
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One increasingly important defense is the presence of mergerspecific efficiencies, since scale efficiencies are often articulated as a
motivation for many mergers. At one time, efficiencies justifications for
mergers were largely ignored on the grounds that even the most
anticompetitive transactions will create some efficiencies. In 1967, the
Supreme Court held that “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which
lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance
in favor of protecting competition.” 136 Intervening years and the
emergence of the Chicago School brought an increased tolerance of
potential anticompetitive effects that are now regarded as potentially
offset by merger specific efficiencies. In 1997, the FTC and U.S.
Department of Justice expanded the efficiencies provisions of the
Merger Guidelines in an effort to delineate how the agencies will
evaluate claimed efficiencies and balance them against potential adverse
competitive effects from mergers. 137 An FTC study published in 2009
reviewed the agency’s experience with efficiencies justifications that
had been proffered for mergers over a ten-year period. 138 Of 118
mergers that were the subject of Bureau of Economics staff memoranda,
50 transactions presented at least one efficiency-related justification. 139
Efficiencies arguments fared reasonably well at the agency, with the
Bureau of Economics accepting roughly 27% of all efficiencies
justifications advocated for merger transactions during the study
period. 140
While efficiencies of scale are considered in approving transactions,
inefficiencies of scale are not, such that mergers resulting in inefficiently
large scale are not disapproved on that particular ground. It is likely that
at least some mega-mergers have had adverse effects on overall
efficiency by creating out-sized firms. However, antitrust hardly puts in
place an “inefficiency filter” to block big mergers that do not create or
136.
137.
138.

FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967).
See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4.
MALCOLM B. COATE & ANDREW J. HEIMERT, FED. TRADE COMM’N, MERGER
EFFICIENCIES AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: 1997– 2007 (2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf.
139. Id. at 34, tbl.1.
140. Id. at 35. Data were also reported for the Bureau of Competition, which
reached substantially similar results, although there was some disparity between the two
wings of the agency. Acceptance or rejection of efficiency defenses by either bureau
was not necessarily reflected in the ultimate determination by the agency itself.
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enhance the exercise of market power even if the merged firm is simply
unwieldy. For example, certain high-profile mega-mergers have proved
to have been ill-conceived and inefficient, such as AOL’s $182 billion
merger with Time Warner in 2001. The combination was touted as
creating a digital media powerhouse with the potential to reach every
American with a computer or a television set. The FTC approved the
merger under a consent decree that sought to prevent Time Warner from
exploiting market power in broadband by discriminating or denying
access in connection with its cable system, 141 which serviced roughly
20% of U.S. households. 142 The concept of the merger proved to be so
ill-advised that within five years Time Warner could not find a buyer for
AOL and was forced to spin off the failed internet access and online
advertising business. 143 The combined assets did not work efficiently
together. One can of course debate whether the FTC’s ex ante review
(or the parties themselves) should have anticipated the inefficiencies
inherent in that transaction, but, even if it had, current antitrust law
would have offered it no grounds on which to oppose the transaction.
At least some scholarly support exists for the proposition that many
mega-mergers in the United States and globally in recent years have
created outsized firms far surpassing efficient scale, resulting in
unwieldy and inefficient, rather than more competitive, enterprises. In
many industries, including financial services, the minimum efficient
scale has increased over time along with technological advances,
deregulation and other developments. However, it seems likely that
merger size has grown at a much larger rate, casting some doubt on the
notion that bank mega-mergers are generally necessary to achieve scale
efficiencies. As long ago as 1993, a scholarly assessment of merger
activity in the banking industry concluded that x-efficiency, or
managerial ability to control costs, played a substantially greater role
than scale efficiencies in the overall performance of banks, and that bank
mergers often did not yield any scale efficiencies at all. 144 Subsequent
141. In re America Online, Inc. and Time-Warner, Inc., Agreement Containing
Consent Orders, (Dec. 14, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/
aolconsent.pdf.
142. See In re America Online, Inc. and Time-Warner, Inc , Analysis of Proposed
Consent Order To Aid Public Comment (Dec. 14, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf.
143. Shira Ovide & Emily Steel, It’s Now Official: AOL, Time Warner to Split,
WALL ST. J., May 29, 2009, at B1.
144. See Dean Amel et al., Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A
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scholarly assessments of consolidation and efficiency in financial
services markets echo similar observations. 145 One study concluded:
“Ex post results of M&As seem to contradict the motivations given by
practitioners for consolidation, which are largely related to issues of
economies of scale and scope and to improvements in management
quality.” 146 Mega-mergers are more or less routine, and have rarely
been blocked by antitrust agencies, at least not since the muchdisparaged cases like Von’s Grocery three decades back.147 In 2008, for
example, InBev’s $52 billion acquisition of Anheuser-Busch topped the
list of mergers exceeding $2 billion. 148
Notwithstanding credible arguments that some mega-mergers
deliver scale inefficiencies, Section 7 does not put the courts or agencies
in a position to second-guess the desirability of a merger that is
otherwise lawful. Horizontal mergers of enormous size are not
objectionable under current standards, which are quite relaxed by
comparison with historic standards or even standards imposed in certain
other jurisdictions. Furthermore, by definition, conglomerate mergers
do not aggregate horizontal market power and are essentially beyond the
reach of Post-Chicago antitrust law. Conglomerate mergers, therefore,
can create behemoth enterprises of ungainly and inefficient proportions
with impunity. An efficiencies defense might be of interest for certain
horizontal mergers, but no defense based on efficiency or otherwise is
required, or even relevant, to a merger that does not increase
concentration or pose a vertical foreclosure problem. Conglomerate and
market extension mergers do neither. Thus, the existing antitrust law
approach to mergers and acquisitions could do almost nothing to prevent
the accumulation of resources into a poorly positioned firm whose own
failure would also risk broader systemic failure.

Review of the International Evidence, Aug. 2002), available at www.federalreserve.gov
/pubs/feds/2002/200247/200247pap.pdf.
145. See id.
146. See id at 42.
147. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
148. See, Dept. of Justice Press Release approving merger with modifications,
available at www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-1008.html. For a summary
of data on mergers and acquisitions ranked by size, see generally INSTITUTE ON
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND ALLIANCES STATISTICS, available at http://www.imaainstitute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions.html. See also JOHN WILLIAMSON, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., LARGEST MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY CORPORATIONS IN 2008 2
(2009).
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Therefore, Post-Chicago antitrust is not a public policy weapon of
much use in preventing too-big-to-fail problems. As a general matter,
Post-Chicago theory concerns itself more with over-deterrence than
under-deterrence, embodies laissez-faire tendencies relying on markets
to self-correct, and, most importantly, applies antitrust law to enhance
allocative efficiency to the virtual exclusion of other societal values.
The too-big-to-fail problem barely intersects with the problem of
optimizing allocative efficiency and, for the same reason, barely invites
antitrust intervention of any sort. The only limitation on this conclusion
is the possibility that Section 5 of the FTC Act might sometimes be
invoked to prevent or dismantle an out-sized merger that created a
substantial likelihood of “unfairness,” based on a rational economic
expectation that the merged firm would operate under presumed bailout
protection.

IV. COULD ANTITRUST LAW HELP?
Since Post-Chicago antitrust has very little to contribute in
combating the too-big-to-fail problem, the natural question becomes:
could antitrust do a better job without doing violence to fundamental
doctrine? Responding to this question presents particular difficulty
because what “fundamental antitrust doctrine” comprises has never been
altogether clear. Indeed, antitrust doctrine has shifted around over time.
However, at one time, antitrust had a broader reach than it currently
does, and the very dynamism of antitrust law could theoretically free up
courts to restore some or all of that earlier reach, or perhaps even give
antitrust another new face, as was done by the Chicago School
revolution. Also, whatever “fundamental antitrust doctrine” means, it
ought to at least include the important and uncontroversial advances that
the law made in response to advances in the field of economics. For
example, “restoring” antitrust should not entail reversing course to redeclare all vertical territorial exclusivity agreements per se illegal
because the potential efficiencies from such arrangements are
uncontroverted. Contrastingly, “restoring” the law’s original distrust of
highly concentrated market structures would not ignore any important or
uncontroversial advances in economics.
If, as is probably the case, many too-big-to-fail companies are in
markets that are highly concentrated (the measurement of which, in turn,
might be open to redesign), then perhaps prophylactic antitrust rules
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could be fashioned to forestall at least some systemic failures. Given the
very high costs of the recent systemic failures, it might be worth
imposing such newly-fashioned antitrust rules even at some more
modest expense in terms of efficiency. Moreover, efficiency claims
made by some too-big-to-fail firms lack much empirical support or even
prima facie plausibility, and so the social costs of dismantling a few
potentially catastrophic firms may be less than advertised in some
quarters. Finally, there is no reason in principle why antitrust must
remain rigidly devoted to economics-based policy as its sole source of
direction.
There is also a substantial difference between preventing and curing
too-big-to-fail problems. Even current antitrust law ought to help make
corrections when markets have failed. It is not surprising that the
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Christine Varney, concluded in
the midst of the recent crisis that: “First, there is no adequate substitute
for a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress.
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in
the Government’s response to economic crises to ensure that markets
remain competitive.” 149 As Professor Maurice Stucke observes (echoing
many others), “antitrust enforcement is not a luxury reserved for more
prosperous times.” 150 Thus, antitrust might play an important curative
role after a too-big-to-fail crisis. Moreover, if restoring competition in
the wake of collapse is an important public policy tool for redressing the
problem, it also seems well worth considering whether the enforcement
of competition law in advance of a collapse might play a preventative
role.
A. HARNESSING THE DYNAMISM OF ANTITRUST
Antitrust law cannot help avert the need for too-big-to-fail bailouts
unless it adapts to address some of the sources of the problem.
However, antitrust is a legal system whose rules are formed and applied
with very specific reference to the policies underlying the law. Those
policies have proved to be subject to dramatic changes over time in

149. Christine A. Varney, Address Before the Center for American Progress:
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in a Challenging Era (May 11, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.pdf.
150. Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism 20 (Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 1323815, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323815.
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response to evolutions in the economy, developments in the related field
of economics, and trends in society and politics. As policies have
changed, so have antitrust rules. Therefore, there is no reason to believe
that antitrust law has settled once and for all upon Post-Chicago policy
and theory. Indeed, the history of antitrust policy is instructive as to this
unlikelihood.
The public policies embodied in the nation’s antitrust laws have
never been precisely clear, but, clearly, antitrust policy has been
anything but stagnant. While some adherents of the Chicago School
have advocated an exclusive focus on consumer welfare, defined as
allocative efficiency, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have
never gone that far. 151 Moreover, antitrust policy has undergone broad
historic shifts. It evolves, sometimes through legislative reform,
sometimes by judicial reinterpretation, and at other times by policy
statements of federal and state enforcement agencies. Indeed, United
States antitrust law has had a rich and varied history in Congress, the
courts and enforcement agencies. A detailed tracing of shifts in policy
underpinnings through time is complex and beyond the scope of this
article, 152 but it is important here to understand how modern antitrust
law came to sharpen and narrow its focus on the objective of allocative
efficiency, or consumer welfare, and how momentous a policy shift was
required to bring us to the narrow Post-Chicago approach.
Antitrust as a legislative response to large enterprise has a
particularly significant and uneven history. While the current policy
devotion to allocative efficiency regards bigness in a neutral or
positively favorable manner, antitrust policies of an earlier era viewed
the presence of large corporations as posing a variety of dangers to our
economy. The early sweeping construction of the Sherman Act
mirrored the prevailing public fear and mistrust of large corporations. 153
In fact, the name “antitrust” derives from the peculiar form of business
organization, the “trust,” that was used to aggregate large business
enterprises under unitary control, in circumvention of the constraints of
19th Century state corporations codes. 154 Early in the 20th Century, the
Supreme Court overruled Trans-Missouri Freight and introduced the

151. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 56 – 77 (4th ed. 2005).
152. For an interesting summary of the evolution of antitrust policy, see id.
153. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
154. SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 6.
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“rule of reason” in its controversial Standard Oil decision, which was
perceived at the time as limiting the reach of the law – although notably
the decision broke apart the Standard Oil trust. 155 A few years later, in
1914, Congress passed what many regarded as remedial legislation in
the Clayton Act. 156 In the 1921 decision of United States v. American
Can Co., the District Court reaffirmed the prevailing view that antitrust
law was designed to address “a public danger” from big business, and a
preference, therefore, for smaller business:
If it be true that size and power, apart from the way in which they
were acquired, or the purpose with which they are used, do not
offend against the law, it is equally true that one of the designs of the
framers of the Anti-Trust Act was to prevent the concentration in a
few hands of control over great industries. They preferred a social
and industrial state in which there should be many independent
producers. Size and power are themselves facts some of whose
consequences do not depend upon the way in which they were
created or in which they are used. It is easy to conceive that they
might be acquired honestly and used as fairly as men who are in
business for the legitimate purpose of making money for themselves
and their associates could be expected to use them, human nature
being what it is, and for all that constitute a public danger, or at all
events give rise to difficult social, industrial and political
157
problems.

155. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court in
Standard Oil sustained a decree that required the dismantling of the Standard Oil trust,
but the rule of reason announced in the case was regarded by Progressives and others as
weakening the law. Justice Harlan’s dissent exclaimed that “the action of the court in
this case might well alarm thoughtful men who revered the Constitution.” Id. at 104.
156. In the presidential election of 1912, antitrust was an important issue that
brought sometimes fierce debate among Woodrow Wilson, William Howard Taft and
Theodore Roosevelt. Once elected, President Wilson pressed for the enactment of the
Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.). See J.P. MILLER, Woodrow Wilson’s
Contributions to Antitrust Policy, in THE PHILOSOPHY AND POLICIES OF WOODROW
WILSON, 132 et seq. (Earl Latham ed., 1958).
157. United States v. American Can Co., 230 F. 859, 902 (D. Md. 1916), appeal
dismissed 256 U.S. 706 (1921). Despite the court’s recognition of these policy
concerns about “size and power” it went on to withhold the government’s requested
decree to break up the company because however large and powerful it was, the
defendant had not misbehaved. “[Congress] has not yet been willing to go far in the
way of regulating and controlling corporations merely because they are large and
powerful, perhaps because many people have always felt that government control is in
itself an evil, and to be avoided whenever it is not absolutely required for the prevention
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In the decades following, enforcement priorities were mixed, with
relatively lax regulation of industrial concentration, 158 but more
aggressive enforcement against certain forms of unfair or exclusive
conduct, such as resale price maintenance, 159 exclusive dealing, 160 and
anticompetitive trade association activity. 161 In the 1930s and 1940s,
following a brief relaxation of antitrust rules under the Codes of Fair
Competition, 162 federal antitrust enforcement expanded to attack
monopolies, 163 vertical integration,164 and various forms of tacit
collusion. 165 At its extreme, the preference for small enterprise was
embodied in the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act. 166 Beginning
around 1950, with the enactment of the Celler-Kefauver amendments to
the Clayton Act, 167 federal antitrust policy became explicit in regarding
large enterprise with some degree of suspicion. In Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, the Supreme Court explained the Celler-Kefauver
amendments as stemming from “a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy,” and
recited an array of public policies behind that enactment, including
economic efficiency, inherent dangers of unchecked corporate
expansion, desirability of local control over industry, protection of small
business, and “the threat to other values” aside from economic ones. 168
of greater wrong.” Id.
158. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
159. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); United States v. A.
Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922).
160. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
161. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Am.
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Maple Flooring
Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
162. The Codes of Fair Competition under the National Recovery Administration
(“NRA”) provided an avenue for antitrust exemptions for corporations that complied
with the standards set out. See ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM
OF MONOPOLY (1966). The NRA and the Codes of Fair Competition barely took effect
before losing public support and eventual condemnation by the Supreme Court in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures., 334 U.S. 131 (1947).
165. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
167. 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1950).
168. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
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Influential economists in the 1950s and 1960s fueled the most
aggressive period of antitrust enforcement against industry
concentration, believing that market structure drove marketplace
performance, ultimately culminating in the 1968 Justice Department
Merger Guidelines. 169
In addressing the too-big-to-fail issue, it is thus important to
recognize that as recently as the 1970s, the antitrust laws were still
understood by at least the courts and some leading scholars to promote a
rich mix of social, political and economic objectives. 170 These included,
among others: advancing economic efficiency, innovation and consumer
welfare; the protection of individual traders and their business freedom
against certain kinds of private interference; the prevention of
antidemocratic political pressures that might flow from concentrations of
economic power and wealth; limiting wealth transfers from consumers
to monopolies and cartels; and (at various times and in varying degrees)
limiting the growth of big business as an end in itself. 171 Walter Adams
and James W. Brock wrote in 1991:
The primary purpose of antitrust is to perpetuate and preserve a
system of governance for a competitive, free enterprise economy.
Efficiency and consumer welfare constitute ancillary benefits that are
expected to flow from a system of economic freedom. Like the U.S.
Constitution, antitrust is concerned primarily with process and only
secondarily with outcomes. Antitrust calls for a dispersion of power,
buttressed by built-in checks and balances, to guard against the abuse
of power and to preserve not only individual freedom, but also more
importantly a free system. Antitrust is founded on a theory of
hostility toward private concentration of power so great that even a
democratic government can be entrusted with it only in exceptional
172
circumstances.

169. See, e.g., MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71. See generally, CARL KAYSEN &
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959);
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); THEODORE P. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST
POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1980).
170. See generally, SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, 11-15; Pitofsky, supra
note 2.
171. Id.
172. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust & Enforceability: An
Empirical Perspective, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS
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Some of these policies do not seem so far removed from the toobig-to-fail problem. The preference for small over large enterprise as an
end in itself bears directly on the matter. Similarly, the preference for
local control over industry, the aim to protect small businessmen and
women from oppression by gigantic corporations, and the desire to
shield democratic institutions from the corrupting influence of
concentrations of wealth might all speak to the problem. Indeed, it may
be that the emergence of a too-big-to-fail enterprise violates every single
policy, other than allocative efficiency, that has ever been mentioned in
connection with the Sherman Act. Moreover, it can also be argued that
even the more strictly economics-driven underpinnings of antitrust have
unnecessarily disregarded the problem of corporate size by ignoring
diseconomies of scale, allowing conglomerate and market extension
merger activity even where consumer welfare may be harmed by
shifting resources into ungainly enterprises and squandering the output,
price and innovation advantages of smaller enterprise. Given the
dynamism of antitrust law and policy, there is good reason to consider a
new dynamic shift.
B. WAS THE PARADOX REALLY SO BAD?
Of course, it is one thing to note that antitrust policy is dynamic
enough to adapt to the too-big-to-fail problem, but quite another to
conclude that it ought to adapt. Many good reasons explain why the
older order of antitrust broke down and gave way to the Chicago School.
However, some of those reasons now seem to have been overstated, and
the antitrust “paradox” that launched the Chicago School antitrust
movement has its own problems. Robert Bork successfully advocated
that pre-Chicago School antitrust policy was paradoxical and “at war”
with itself. 173 More specifically, he argued that there had never been any
policy underpinning to antitrust other than allocative efficiency and that,
by embracing other policies, courts had created an internally inconsistent
law that sought to promote efficiency but also rewarded inefficient firms
with viable antitrust claims. However, was it really so bad for a statute
with the breadth and importance of the Sherman Act to embrace
multiple policies that sometimes were in tension with one another?
Even if the answer is yes, which is not clear, was abandoning all
ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POLICY

173.

See BORK, supra note 51.

152-60 (Harry First et al., eds. 1991).
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antitrust policies aside from allocative efficiency really always in the
best interests of consumers, or were Bork’s laissez-faire achievements
instead in the interests of the corporations to which consumers turn for
goods and services? Finally, have laissez-faire policies themselves led
to the paradoxical result that government ultimately has been forced to
take a greater role in the private sector?
It was an overstatement to say that antitrust never was concerned
with anything except allocative efficiency or that antitrust policy never
objected to large enterprise for other reasons. In fact, that assertion
behind the Chicago School argument is bizarrely at odds with history.
Nearly 100 years ago, Justice Harlan described the Sherman Act as
arising from a universal conviction that “the country was in real danger
from another kind of slavery . . . that would result from the aggregations
of capital in the hands of a few.” 174 That was not a statement about
allocative efficiency. As discussed above, the first 100 years of antitrust
jurisprudence seem to contain an unwavering commitment to a number
of competing policies sometimes acknowledged to be in tension with
one another.
Furthermore, it is arguable that laissez-faire policies indeed yielded
a paradox of their own by bringing about the recent need for massive
government intrusion into the private sector. In what has turned out to
be a prescient warning about the perils of the then-emergent Chicago
School, in 1979, Robert Pitofsky wrote:
It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By ‘political values,’ I
mean, first, a fear that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures, and, second, a desire to
enhance individual and business freedom by reducing the range
within which private discretion by a few in the economic sphere
controls the welfare of all. A third and overriding political concern
is that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to develop
under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns, the
likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate
giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more
175
intrusive role in economic affairs.

This final prediction could not have been more accurate.

The

174. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 83 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175. See Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 1051 (emphasis added).
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emergence of a few corporate giants that were left to take underregulated risks and to grow without significant government intervention
eventually forced the United States government to become the largest
investor in the U.S. automobile industry, a controlling owner of some of
the largest banks and other financial institutions in the country, as well
as to infuse hundreds of billions of dollars into the private financial
sector in the form of equity investments, loans and loan guarantees. 176
The government has also injected federal funds into the home mortgage
refinance marketplace to forestall foreclosures. 177 All of this bailout
activity came with unavoidable pressures for governmental control over
a range of private enterprise decision making, even including
management compensation. Additional government intervention of a
more durable sort also seems inevitable as Congress and regulatory
agencies respond to a stinging public backlash against a government that
is perceived (rightly or not) to have let the country’s booming economy
disintegrate. Federal and state regulation addressing dozens of areas of
economic activity including real estate mortgage lending practices,
trading in derivatives and other securities, solvency of financial
institutions, management compensation and corporate governance has
been enacted or is under consideration. 178 All of this can, in some
measure, be attributed to inadequate government oversight of sectors of
the economy that are “dominated by a few corporate giants.” Thus the
new paradox: laissez-faire policies that have led to unprecedented
government intervention in the private sector.
Which paradox is worse? One problem with myopic attention to
allocative efficiency is that consumers could be worse off if firms must
be too big to fail to achieve optimum scale. The too-big-to-fail problem
never figured into economic arguments for “letting the marketplace
decide,” and it changes the equation. Suppose, for the sake of argument,
that banks in the United States really need to be as big as the nation just
permitted them to become to compete for one-stop-shopping corporate
customers in the global financial services markets. That is, suppose that
176. See generally, BAILOUTS: PUBLIC MONEY, PRIVATE PROFIT (Wright, Robert E.
ed. 2009).
177. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat.
2654 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
178. See, e.g., Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613;
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765;
Troubled Asset Relief Program, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
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their current gigantic size has not yet crested optimum efficient scale.
That does not necessarily mean that their gigantic size could not pose a
threat of greater consumer harm than would follow from the marginal
loss of scale efficiency that would result (by hypothesis, at least) if the
banks were required to be a bit smaller. Certainly, some consumer harm
has resulted from the too-big-to-fail problem even if one assumes that
these same firms were generating economies of scale as they claim.
Commissioner Rosch correctly noted that the failure of a too-big-to-fail
enterprise causes consumer harm in the form of reduced output,
resulting in higher prices and possibly diminished innovation, and no
one has ever measured those harms against whatever consumer benefits
supposedly flow from allowing firms to become too-big-to-fail. 179 Thus,
even if it would be a paradox of one sort to impose antitrust-based limits
on some corporate size, it may equally be a paradox of another sort not
to – even viewing antitrust myopically as concerned with nothing except
output, price and innovation.
C. THE PROBLEM OF DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
Post-Chicago antitrust contains yet another paradox, or at least an
inconsistency worthy of further study: optimum scale efficiency is
considered measurable and a presentable basis for allowing a merger
transaction, but excessive-scale inefficiency is not considered a proper
basis on its own for disallowing a merger. That is, no court or agency
has ever blocked a merger on the exclusive grounds of scale
diseconomies, let alone that the merged entity would be too big to fail –
there has to be another basis for antitrust to intervene. The reverse no
longer holds true since the revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines
in 1997. 180 The Guidelines now provide for a quantitative assessment of
merger specific efficiencies, and indicate that the agencies will consider
such efficiencies as capable of offsetting some potential adverse
competitive effects of a merger. Although the Guidelines acknowledge
that efficiencies “are difficult to verify,” they invite merger proponents
to “substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify by
reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted
efficiency.” Nowhere do the Guidelines attempt to quantify or address
the consumer harm that can result when an otherwise benign merger
179.
180.

Rosch, supra note 20.
See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4.
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creates an out-sized merged enterprise of inefficient scale.
Diseconomies of scale can harm consumer welfare just as much as
the prevention of economies of scale. Diseconomies of scale result
when a firm’s marginal cost begins to exceed long-run average costs. 181
This can occur when a firm’s size becomes so unwieldy that each
additional unit of production costs more than the one before. Among the
many causes that have been studied include the tendency for large
organizations to isolate decision makers from the results of their
decisions 182 – a familiar theme in recent discussions about corporate
compensation excesses divorced from performance measures. Other
causes of diseconomies of scale in large enterprises include increased
communications costs, duplication of effort, inertia, and internal culture
clashes. 183 By definition, when a firm exceeds optimum scale, each
additional unit produced costs more, and consumers pay the price for
that. Why is it that optimal scale efficiency is measurable and
constitutes a proper consideration to permit a transaction and overcome
some anticompetitive potential, yet diseconomies of scale are not
considered worthy of any sort of antitrust inquiry at all (other than
perhaps to rebut claims of scale economies)?
This may add one more justification for antitrust to address itself to
some too-big-to-fail problems. Although current antitrust rules do
nothing to preserve smaller enterprise for its own sake, even the
narrowest economic doctrinal underpinnings may support doing so in
some limited circumstances.

V. CONCLUSIONS
Antitrust is quintessentially addressed to the optimum organization
of the nation’s economy, even if it does not purport to address all aspects
of it. The central concern of antitrust law is economic power and its
potential to be misused. Vast aggregations of economic power in
convergence with other phenomena cause too-big-to-fail crises. It
therefore stands to reason that antitrust ought to be concerned with some

181. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 532. A seminal explanation of socalled “X-inefficiency” is found at Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. “XEfficiency,” 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 392 (1966).
182. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 120, at 532.
183. Id.
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aspects of the too-big-to-fail problem, at least insofar as the problem
stems from aggregated economic size and power. Since the too-big-tofail problem is complex, it is unsurprising that antitrust alone is not the
cure, but it could make a difference by controlling certain forms of
conduct that lead to firms becoming excessively large.
The foregoing considerations lead to a few conclusions and
proposals for bringing antitrust into the public policy discussion about
preventing or limiting the need for public rescues of private firms that
are too big, too interconnected and perhaps too powerful to be allowed
to fail.
A. EXISTING ANTITRUST MERGER LAW COULD HELP PREVENT
SOME OUT-SIZED COMBINATIONS
Antitrust law reaches a range of business practices, and many of
them (such as price discrimination) are unlikely ever to have any role in
the creation of a too-big-to-fail crisis. The most relevant prohibitions
relate to mergers. Although some firms become too-big-to-fail by
internal growth, the public has at times been forced to rescue some firms
that grew by merger activity. It is perfectly appropriate for antitrust law
to consider whether a merger transaction threatens consumer harm. The
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines are currently under review, and
some attention might be paid in the final product to the problems related
to combinations that create merged entities that are too-big-to-fail.
Although too-big-to-fail is not central to most merger analysis,
enormous consumer harm has resulted from allowing corporate growth
to create so many indispensible firms. Put differently, since size
contributes to the problem, controlling size might contribute to a
solution. A few ways exist in which antitrust law might more
assertively intervene to control the population growth in the too-big-tofail category of businesses.
1. Diseconomies of Scale in Merger Analysis
Mergers could be reviewed under a modified standard that takes
into account the possibility that the merged entity will simply be too big
measured by its own economics. Since consumer harm in the form of
higher prices and reduced output can result from allowing a firm to
achieve a scale that exceeds the optimum, here is one place where
antitrust might play a role without much adaptation from its current
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approach. However, this is a controversial proposal, to be sure, because
the Clayton Act only prohibits combinations whose effects “may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,” and
theoretically a firm could exceed optimum scale without doing either of
those things. 184 There will also be disagreement about what constitutes
efficient scale, as is already a matter of public debate about the size of
the nation’s four largest banks. Still, sometimes a firm’s becoming very
large and inefficient will dampen competition and place upward pressure
on prices, and that should be of concern to antitrust agencies and courts.
Another objection would be that the government ought not to
intervene in the entrepreneurial process by dictating optimum scale
instead of allowing the marketplace to decide. If a firm decides to grow
to a certain size in the hope of obtaining a competitive advantage, it may
be argued that the government should not determine that such a
marketplace gamble is inefficient. Notably, other types of likely
inefficient results of mergers are already taken into account in orthodox
merger review. For example, it is understood that a profit maximizing
monopoly may be willing to spend resources inefficiently to retain its
monopoly position, such as through various forms of costly predation,
so long as the costs do not exceed the monopoly profits. Also, those
who will argue that the government has no business deciding the
optimum scale of private enterprise need to explain why the efficiencies
provisions added to the 1992 Guidelines do not run afoul of the same
principle. If economists can take measurements to assure the public that
a business combination will achieve scale efficiencies sufficient to offset
presumptive monopoly power, they ought equally to be able to warn the
public that another merger would move the combined firm beyond the
optimal scale. The standard analysis of merger-specific efficiencies is a
complex one, but its basic arithmetic is simple enough: the presumptive
monopoly deadweight welfare loss is calculated to be a number that is
less than the combined firm’s reduction in cost-per-unit times the
number of units produced. 185 The converse should be no more difficult
184. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), is not
limited by the language of the Clayton Act.
185. Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the efficiencies “defense” only comes into
play where the transaction is presumptively anticompetitive based on the structural and
behavioral analysis set forth in the Guidelines. This means that efficiencies as a defense
is only calculated where there is at least a presumption of post-merger market power
sufficient to reduce output, raise prices and thus create a monopoly “deadweight welfare
loss.” MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 71, § 4.
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or speculative. Of course, just as scale efficiencies are difficult for
merger proponents to quantify, those opposing a combination on
inefficiency grounds should bear a similar burden. Oftentimes, the
burden may turn out to be too great, in which case a diseconomies of
scale filter would do no good. However, a diseconomies of scale filter
would not appear to do any harm and it might prevent some out-sized
combinations that create inefficient firms.
2. Too-Big-to-Fail as a Factor in Merger Analysis
A second proposal that would entail little or no adjustment of
current antitrust economics dogma is to incorporate the too-big-to-fail
problem itself into merger review standards. This was Commissioner
Rosch’s idea, 186 which he acknowledged to be a provocative one.
However, the controversy is not one about the basic economics of PostChicago antitrust. Assuming a merger presents a palpable prospect of
creating a firm that cannot be allowed to fail under conditions where
failure can be foreseen, the threat of antitrust-type consumer harm from
the transaction may meet the standard of incipiency under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act. For example, the recent
banking industry mergers that were permitted as a sort of private bailout
of the acquired banks could be analyzed along these lines. In
appropriate cases, it would seem to do no violence to current PostChicago antitrust law and policy to block such mergers on these
grounds, since consumer harm via reduced output, higher prices and
impaired innovation are uncontroversial objects of antitrust sanctions.
Again, quantifying the threat to consumer harm may be daunting and the
burden of establishing such a likelihood should not be a light one since
the likelihood that any particular firm will at some point meet all of the
criteria of a too-big-to-fail enterprise is not a routine conclusion. A firm
might present only a very remote too-big-to-fail threat at the time it
proposes a merger, and that threat might not materialize until it is too
late for antitrust intervention under existing antitrust theory. One can
anticipate any number of problems, but the concept remains a sound
one: allowing firms to merge into a size that could not be allowed to fail
through normal bankruptcy proceedings presents a threat to consumer
welfare that is indistinguishable from the harms that flow from mergers
we already block for other reasons. If one of the nation’s four largest
186.

See, Rosch, supra note 20.
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banks proposed to combine with another large financial services firm,
would it be too much to ask whether a non-publicly funded resolution
would be feasible if their liabilities were to become unmanageable? It is
the rare merger that ought to present such a question, and, in those few
contexts, the question seems an appropriate one to consider.
B. TOWARDS A PARTIAL RESTORATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY
It is time to set aside the myth that antitrust law has always had as
its sole objective the optimum allocation of productive resources and to
restore to antitrust the policies that were jettisoned by the Chicago
School by including reference to these broader policies in formulating
and applying antitrust rules. It is modern mythology to suggest that
antitrust was never intended to limit the economic and political power of
the trusts. That myth was merely one of the arguments, and not the most
forceful, for moving antitrust into a laissez-faire posture that trusted
markets to make better decisions than the courts or agencies. The
primary Chicago School objection to older antitrust policy, the real
“antitrust paradox,” was that it rewarded inefficient market participants
with antitrust remedies exacted from their more efficient rivals. This
paradox does not need to be revived in antitrust law. Rather, what ought
to be restored in antitrust rules are those policies that were directed at
protecting consumers, traders, democratic institutions and the economy
against the perils of excessive concentrations of corporate economic
power. While courts and agencies never explicitly repudiated these noneconomic antitrust policy objectives, they have ignored and, at times,
disparaged them. Competitor collaborations, conduct of monopolies and
potentially catastrophic mergers should be subject to antitrust review
that takes these other policies into account.
The too-big-to-fail public policy problem directly intersects with
these other antitrust values, while almost not at all overlapping with
allocative efficiency concerns. Perhaps the core value of antitrust is its
preference for marketplace activity to serve the needs of consumers.
However, when firms are rescued through public bailouts, the
government almost inevitably must intrude into the machinery of the
marketplace – just the result antitrust seeks to avoid. That alone would
form a reasonable basis for objecting on antitrust grounds to the
formation of a too-big-to-fail firm. Thus, a central tenet of antitrust
should favor some control to prevent the combination of firms into toobig-to-fail companies whose indispensability poses a risk of displacing
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normal marketplace activity with ad hoc crisis-driven government
intervention. Antitrust ought to block a proposed merger that would
create a firm exceeding maximum optimal scale and whose failure, if it
occurred, would foreseeably require government bailout intervention.
Furthermore, antitrust’s political policy recognizes a threat to
democratic institutions that has considerable resonance today. When
firms become so large that they cannot be allowed to fail, they also tend
to have disproportionate power over the political process. For example,
a perception exists that the mega-banks formed via a combination of
bail-outs and mergers significantly influenced Congressional reform of
financial services regulation. A Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist for the
New York Times observed: “Three years into the crisis, we are no closer
to reining in too-powerful-to-fail companies or eliminating the risks that
they pose to taxpayers.” 187 Had the original intent of the Sherman Act
been considered in connection with the recent perplexing decision to
solve the too-big-to-fail problem by creating even bigger banks, perhaps
a different and more tempered outcome might have emerged from the
process.
Antitrust also seeks to protect the freedom of traders to do business
without anticompetitive interference or exclusion from the marketplace.
Klor’s 188 makes a most interesting case in point. That case involved
allegations that a rival retailer formed a conspiracy with manufacturers
to boycott and ruin the plaintiff. 189 The boycott was held to fall within
the per se prohibitions of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 190 Yet, Klor’s
was a single retailer in a competitive market served by sufficiently many
others such that no allocative efficiency justification exists for the result
in that case. 191 Indeed, the complaint under review in that case might
not withstand a motion to dismiss under the newer standards for Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12 192 in force today, since it was implausible
that the manufacturers would have any incentive to collude with one
another to exclude a customer from the market. In any event, under the
Post-Chicago view, Klor’s was wrongly decided because consumers

187.

Gretchen Morgenson, Future Bailouts of America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010,

at 1.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
Id., at 209.
Id., at 212-14.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 12. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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were not harmed by having one less retailer in a densely populated
retailer marketplace. Still, what is objectionable about a rule that
prohibits rivals from joining together to force another enterprise out of
business, even if consumers do not pay higher prices as a result of the
exclusion? Assuming the truth of the allegations, Klor’s was deprived
of the freedom to conduct business. Until the Chicago School, a public
policy against the very deprivation of such freedom formed a part of
anti-monopoly law since at least the Case of Monopolies in 1603. 193 It is
no objection to such a rule to say that inefficient rivals whose failure is
their own fault will try to blame others and sue them on trumped up
antitrust claims. Courts can and should decide whether defendants
colluded or not. If they have colluded to drive someone out of the
market, it seems a reasonable and time-honored public policy to give the
victim a remedy at law, regardless of whether consumers paid higher
prices as a consequence.
The policy of protecting the freedom of traders also plays a part in
the too-big-to-fail discussion, because the moral hazard problem places
the mega-enterprise at a distinctly unfair advantage that could prevent
smaller rivals from thriving. How, for example, could a small bank
offer competitive terms on credit transactions if its largest rivals in the
same market have the ability to take risks whose downside potential is
backed by the United States Treasury? This policy, if considered, would
bring yet another consideration into play in evaluating a small number of
mergers that present a plausible too-big-to-fail risk.
C. LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITY
Further amending antitrust law to block the formation of a too-bigto-fail firm would be consistent with the original intent of the Sherman
Act, and certainly with intervening enactments, such as the CellerKefauver amendments to the Clayton Act. Additionally, amending the
Clayton Act to permit the break-up of a firm that has grown to such
proportions might move antitrust in a novel direction. These sorts of
legislative enactments are under consideration, and it is beyond the
scope of this article to draw a conclusion as to whether public policy
would be well or ill served by their enactment. However, if a too-big-tofail statute were to be enacted, the foregoing discussion suggests that
doing so would only do violence to very recent antitrust orthodoxy, but
193.

See Darcy v. Allin, 77 E.R. 1260 (1601).
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would not offend historic and original policies behind American
antitrust law. The presence of these oversized enterprises, whose
numbers are growing, threatens the political system because their
indispensability makes them nearly impossible to govern. It also
menaces important markets with the uneven playing field created by the
moral hazard problem. Moreover, the presence of oversized enterprises
poses the risk of unusually catastrophic harm to vast numbers of
consumers and the public treasury. These are concerns that certainly are
not new to antitrust.

